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Abstract
Program verification is vital as more and more users are creating, downloading and execut-
ing foreign computer programs. Software verification tools provide a means for determining
if a program adheres to a user’s security requirements, or security policy. There are many
verification tools that exist for checking different types of policies on different types of
programs. Currently however, there is no verification tool capable of determining if all
types of programs satisfy all types of policies.
This thesis describes a framework for supporting multiple verification tools to determine
program satisfaction. A user’s security requirements are represented at multiple levels of
abstraction as Intermediate Execution Environments. Using a sequence of configurations,
a user’s security requirements are transformed from the abstract level to the tool level,
possibly for multiple verification tools. Using a number of case studies, the validity of the
framework is shown.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The use of software programs is increasing every day. Software programs are produced
by sources ranging from known companies to unknown entities and the end-user who also
executes the program. Ensuring that these programs are secure and do not harm users’
computers is increasingly important.
Consider web pages as an example of a security risk. More and more users are viewing
web pages that contain embedded JavaScript. These embedded Javascript programs might,
for example, upload a number of files specified by the user to a designated server. Without
any security measures, the user has no guarantee that the JavaScript program uploads only
the specified files to only the designated server. All the user’s security requirements, such
as a guarantee that only the specified files are uploaded, can be stated in a policy that all
programs must adhere to prior to being executed.
Potentially unsecure or untrusted programs can be received in a variety of ways including
 Viewing web pages as mentioned above,
 Opening emailed electronic documents with embedded code. For example, code can
be embedded within a PostScript file such that it is executed when viewed with
Ghostscript; and,
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 Adding external hardware, such as USB memory sticks, to existing hardware.
Regardless of their source, ensuring the security of software programs is essential.
1.1 Program Verification
What exactly constitutes program security varies from user to user. However, each user
has requirements that programs must adhere to for them to be allowed to be executed on
their machine. For some systems, such as Microsoft Vista, Mac OS and the Java VM,
there is an inbuilt access control mechanism that allows a specified level of security to be
enforced within the system.
There are two main ways to ensure that a program behaves properly. The first is to
restrict the types of programs that can be executed by revoking certain privileges. These
privileges can be revoked by the language that the program is implemented in, such as
sandbox environments, or by filtering system calls to deny access to potentially dangerous
systems calls. The main problem with such mechanisms is that they limit the expressiveness
of executable applications.
The second main way is to check or verify a program. Program verification is the process
of determining whether a program adheres to a user’s security requirements specified in a
policy. Manually checking this requires a user to look through and analyse software code
to determine if the requirements are satisfied. In practice, this is unrealistic for even small
programs because, even by an expert, it is extremely difficult and prone to human error.
Therefore, tools that automate program verification are necessary.
Automated program verification can be performed by one of two main techniques.
The first is to monitor the execution of a program, that is, dynamic program verification
performed at runtime. Note that attacks based on buffer overflows [CPM+98] can be
prevented by ensuring appropriate run time checks. Checking safety at run time however
2
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
could have a significant speed penalty. The second technique is to statically check a
program before it is executed. Approaches like model checking [CEE+01] and theorem
proving [Bib87] can be used to statically verify a program.
Model checking is in principle an automatic technique that can be used to ensure that
a program possesses some required properties. Model checking requires the program to
be modeled as an automaton with its properties expressed in a form of logic. For model
checking to be automatic a model that represents the program as a finite state automaton
is required. Theorem proving, on the other hand, is a semi-automatic technique that relies
on the program and its properties being precisely specified in a form of logic. While it
is possible to automate a large proportion of theorem proving, sometimes an expert is
required to guide the system. Combining static analysis with dynamic checking has also
shown promise. Huang et al. [HYH+04], for example, show how security of web applications
can be improved by using a combination of static analysis and runtime monitoring.
1.2 Limitations of Program Verifiers
No verification tool can determine satisfaction of all user’s security requirements on every
program. There are three main reasons for this:
1. The input language of the program,
2. The method used to verify the program, and
3. The type of security requirements that need to be verified.
There are many options for the input language of a program including source code in
one of the many programming languages that currently exist (e.g., Java, C and Haskell)
or compiled code. As a result of the numerous options, no current verification tool can
3
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handle all program input languages. In fact, most verification tools accept only a single
program input language.
Furthermore, the method used to perform verification determines the policies that can
be verified. For example, tools that implement theorem proving techniques are capable of
verifying all policies specified in a form of logic, but specifying programs in a form that
can be verified by a theorem prover is not easy. On the other hand, an abstraction of
a model appropriate for a model checking tool can be created relatively easily; however,
model checking tools have a limited set of policies that can be verified on given models.
Using a single tool for program verification is sometimes insufficient. To verify all of a
user’s requirements of a given program, multiple verification tools may be required. The
motivation for this dissertation is to contribute to the problem of how best to utilise and
combine multiple verification tools.
1.3 Goals of this Dissertation
Using multiple verification tools to verify a program typically requires multiple security
policies to be specified, one for each verification tool used. The main disadvantage of
this process is that there is an overhead cost associated with specifying multiple security
policies. However, by combining policy languages, a user’s security requirements can be
represented once in a single language and used by one or more verification tools to enforce
those requirements on a given program.
To date, limited work has been done on combining policy languages. The aim of this
dissertation is to address a part of this research gap by describing a framework for leveraging
verification tools to enhance the verification technologies available for policy enforcement.
Specifically, this dissertation makes the following contributions:
1. Using the concepts viewed in existing policy languages, language theory is used to
4
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capture a user’s security requirements for multiple representations.
2. Using language theory, a framework is built for transforming a user’s security re-
quirements. The framework allows a user’s security requirements to be automatically
transformed into multiple representations for multiple verification tools.
3. To aid in the transformation process, manually created configurations that describe
how to transform between representations and how to link these transformed rep-
resentations are included. Appropriate configurations, such as these, allow a user’s
requirements to be more easily updated and maintained.
4. What it means for a program to satisfy a user’s requirements in terms of the generated
representations of those requirements and the tools used to enforce those requirements
is clearly defined.
These specific contributions advance current understanding of the best way to combine
policy languages in an effort to allow multiple verification tools to be used without the
overhead cost of specifying multiple security policies.
1.4 Structure of this Dissertation
The remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows. Background material describing
policy representations, verification tools and their current limitations is presented in Chap-
ter 2. Chapter 3 describes both the language for representing a user’s requirements and
the framework for transforming between these representations. Chapter 4 then validates
the framework via case studies and shows the flexibility of the framework by using config-
urations. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation with a discussion of the framework
and possible future research.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
Program verification can be divided into two parts: representation and evaluation. Rep-
resentation deals with representing a user’s security requirements in a suitable language,
while evaluation deals with determining if a program adheres to the user’s security require-
ments.
This chapter is organised into three sections. Section 2.1 describes the current work on
representing a user’s security requirements. Section 2.2 describes the current techniques
for determining program verification. Finally, section 2.3 describes the main framework
that exists for combining policy languages.
2.1 Policy Specification
A security policy consists of sets of constraints on a system’s behaviour [BS03]. A security
policy is a syntactic representation of the security properties (or requirements) a user wants
a program to satisfy. Security properties specify the security goals to be achieved and the
language used to encode a security policy depends on the security properties that must be
enforced. Security properties can be divided into four main categories [VPS02, BS03]:
6
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1. Confidentiality,
2. Authenticity,
3. Integrity, and
4. Availability.
The most popular security property is confidentiality [BS03]. Confidentiality deals with
the protection of confidential information and ensuring access to resources is restricted to
only to users with authorised access. When a request for access to a resource is made, the
system needs to know from whom the request came in order to determine if the request
should be granted or denied. Authentication deals with confirming a user’s identity. In-
tegrity deals with data modification and ensuring that data is complete through transfers,
storage and revival. Finally, availability deals with the interruption of system functionality
and the ability to access system resources. That is, ensuring that if a user has authorised
access to a given resource then they are not prevented from accessing that resource. Tra-
ditionally, availability has been the security property that has received the least attention
from the scientific and academic community [Sta02].
The remainder of this section discusses how these properties can be represented. Sec-
tion 2.1.1 describes three main models for representing requirements while section 2.1.2
describes security policy representations for representing the four main categories of poli-
cies.
2.1.1 Models of Security
Three models of security are described in this section: the Bell-LaPadula model, the Biba
integrity model and the Chinese Wall model.
The Bell-LaPadula Model [Bis03] is a way of modeling confidentiality requirements. In
7
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
the Bell-LaPadula Model, subjects (users) and resources (objects) have security classifica-
tions that specify the level of security of each user and resource. Security levels range from
the most sensitive (e.g. “Top Secret”) down to the least sensitive (e.g. “Unclassified” or
“Public”).
The Bell-LaPadula Model combines mandatory and discretionary access control with
two distinct Mandatory Access Control (MAC) properties.
1. The Simple Security Property states that a subject at a given security level may not
read any object at a higher security level.
2. The ∗−Property states that a subject at a given security level may not write to any
object at a lower security level.
These two properties are characterised by the phase no read up, no write down which
ensures that secure information is not leaked.
The Biba integrity model [Bis03] describes a set of access control rules designed to
ensure data integrity. In the Biba integrity model, users and resources are grouped into
ordered levels of integrity. Integrity levels differ from security levels in that the higher the
level of integrity, the more confidence one has that a program will execute correctly. Thus,
data and information at a high level is more accurate.
Similar to the Bell-LaPadula model, the Biba integrity model defines two MAC prop-
erties:
1. The Simple Integrity Axiom states that a subject at a given integrity level may not
read an object at a lower integrity level.
2. The ∗−Integrity Axiom states that a subject at a given integrity level must not write
to any object at a higher level of integrity.
8
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
These two properties are characterised by the phase no read down, no write up which
ensures the integrity of data.
The Chinese Wall model [Bis03] is a model of security that refers equally to confiden-
tiality and integrity. A Chinese Wall is an informal barrier to separate and isolate users to
avoid ‘conflict of interest’ problems. The basis of the Chinese Wall model is that users are
only allowed access to information which does not conflict with any other information to
which they already have access. Thus unlike Bell-LaPadula, access to information is not
restricted by attributes of the information, but by the information for which a user already
holds access rights.
In the Chinese Wall model, information is grouped into related classes. In the business
world for example, this would typically be information concerning the same corporation.
The Chinese Wall model specifies that access is granted if and only if the information is in
the same class (that is, within the confines of the wall), or belongs to a different class that
does not have a ‘conflict of interest’ issue. Referring again to the business world, competing
corporations would be in different classes that were in conflict with each other so competing
corporations could not access information on one another. A further restriction is that if a
user requests write access within a class then its read access is strictly restricted to within
that same class.
2.1.2 Security Policy Representations
The previous section describes three models for reasoning about security. There are many
ways these models can be implemented to specify a user’s security requirements. This sec-
tion describes the main mechanisms for representing policies that specify a user’s security
requirements.
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Access Control
Access control is one of the most widely used security mechanisms [HMHX07], which is
typically used for specifying confidentiality and integrity requirements. The simplest way
to define users’ control to resources is by using an access control list (ACL). ACLs are
lists of permissions attached to resources that state who or what is allowed to access each
resource and what operations are allowed to be performed on that resource.
One of the simplest implementations of an ACL is an access matrix [Lam74]. Access
matrices are simple tables stating the rights users have on resources. An example is below.
File1 File2 File3
Alice {read,write} {read} {execute}
Bob {read,write} {read} {execute}
While access matrices are simple and work well in centralised systems, in the real world
where systems are decentralised and users’ access rights are frequently changing, they do
not suffice. This is because traditional ACL systems assign permissions to individual users
which becomes cumbersome in a large system.
An alternative to ACLs is role based access control (RBAC), in which roles are created
and permissions to perform operations are assigned to specific roles. RBAC also differs from
ACLs in that ACLs assign permissions to specific files whereas RBAC assigns permissions
to operations. For example, an ACL could be used to allow a user read access to a certain
file, but this access does not specify how that file could be changed. Using RBAC, a
user in a particular role may be allowed to perform a certain operation that, for example,
populates a file with records.
Security Enhanced Linux, SELinux [LS01a, SF01, SVS01, Sma02, LS01b], extends
Linux with a flexible role based access control mechanism. The access control mechanism
allows SELinux to enforce an administratively-defined policy over all processes and users
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in the system. Security policies for SELinux are encoded as access vector rules specifying
the permissions that users and groups have on objects.
KAoS [BDC+95], Rei [Kag02, KFJ03] and Ponder [DDEL01] are all policy languages
for representing access control requirements. Each language allows four types of policies
to be encoded: positive and negative authorisations and positive and negative obligations.
Positive and negative authorisations refer to the rights a user has and does not have
respectively. That is, authorisation requirements specify the actions a user is and is not
allowed to perform. Obligation requirements on the other hand refer to the actions that
must be performed and are typically event driven. Thus, when a specific event occurs,
some action must or must not be performed in the case of a positive or negative obligation
respectively. Each language then represents these types of policies in a different syntax.
An alternative approach to access control taken by Venkatakrishan et al. in [VPS02] is
to empower programs rather than typically disabling them. Venkatakrishan et al. represent
policies as Extended Finite State Automata (EFSA), which allows the enforcement of
these policies to be made efficiently via runtime monitoring. An EFSA has states and
transitions on pairs of states like conventional finite state automata. In addition, EFSAs
are augmented with variables along the transitions which are used to store event arguments.
In Venkatakrishan et al.’s work, the security-relevant behaviour of a program is modeled
in terms of sequences of externally observable actions, or events. In the context of Java for
example, such events include method entries and exists. A security policy then specifies
constraints on the sequence of such events that may be produced by a program. These
constraints are implemented using the transition variables in EFSAs.
While access control policies are primarily used for encoding confidentiality require-
ments, they can also be used to represent integrity requirements. As an example, Jajodia
et al. in [JSS97] show how access control policies can be used to represent separation of
duty requirements. To achieve this Jajodia et al. state policies as mappings from 4-tuples
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(object, subject, role set, action) to either authorised or denied.
Access control policies have also been extended to include availability properties. Evans
et al. in [ET99] show how simple access control policies can be extended to address resource
usage. Evans et al. use resource descriptions to abstractly describe system resources and
the ways they can be manipulated. In this case, policies are defined by attaching code
checks to resource operations.
Information Flow
Information flow is a different mechanism for specifying confidentiality requirements. In-
formation flow control deals with controlling the flow of information to ensure confidential
information remains confidential and is not leaked. Much work on information flow has
been done by Myers et al. [ML97, ML98, Mye99, ML00, SM03, CM04]. In general, the
secrecy of data and controlling the flow of information can be represented by putting re-
sources and users into classes. Different classes define different levels of security. Ensuring
the confidentiality of information is then ensuring that users in one class cannot access
resources in another of a higher security level (as in the Bell-LaPadula Model).
One common method for performing this is by defining security classes as types and
using a set of typing rules to control the flow of information between those classes. There
are many type systems for this, most of which are based on the spi calculus [AG97]. Abadi’s
type system [Aba99], Abadi and Blanchet’s type system [AB01] and Gordon and Jeffrey’s
type system [GJ02] are examples of type systems for specifying information flow policies.
Abadi and Blanchet’s type system [AB01] is briefly described here as an example of how
types can be used to encode information flow control policies. In their system they define
two main types: public and secret. Public is the type given to all data that is public, that
is, data that can be accessed by anyone. Secret is the type given to all data that is secret,
that is, data that cannot be accessed by an attacker. All data, channels and encryption
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keys are given a type. Type checking then ensures that no data of type secret is accessed
by something with type public. As an example, let us consider a public channel b, which
is used to output two pieces of information: public data, and a public channel that itself
is used to send secret data. In this example, b would have the type
b : C Public[Public,C Public[Secret ]]
.
Similar systems can be used to specify integrity policies. Zdancewic in [Zda03] describes
a type system using various levels of security lattices. Here, security lattices are similar
to types, however, they describe the integrity level of data rather than the confidentiality
level of data.
Access Control Using Logic
One problem with many policy languages is that they are tied to their implementation.
Policy languages that are encoded in logic move away from the implementation and separate
policy from mechanism.
In 1992, Woo and Lam [WL92, WL93] created a logic for representing authorisation
requirements. Their logic was based on representing three structural properties apparent
in authorisation requirements: closure, default and inheritance properties.
Closure properties are used to ensure the consistency of authorisation requirements.
For example, if a user is allowed write access to a file, they should also be allowed read
access. Default properties are used to define the course of action that should be taken in
the absence of any applicable explicit policies. Most real systems use defaults properties.
The most common example is a restrictive policy whereby access is denied unless explicitly
authorised. Inheritance properties are used to precisely define how to resolve any incon-
sistencies in a policy. For example, if a user belongs to two groups where one group allows
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read access to a file and the other group denies read access to the same file, what access
should the user have? Inheritance properties answer this question.
Given these three structural properties, Woo and Lam devised a logic for representing
authorisation requirements. Authorisation requirements in their logic are encoded as rules.
A rule has three components: a prerequisite (f ), an assumption (f ′), and a consequent (g),
written f :f
′
g
. The meaning of a rule is that g is enforced if f is true, and there is no other
rule contradicting f ′.
Given a set of rules specifying a user’s requirements, before a user can perform a
particular access on a resource, the user must first obtain the access rights for that resource.
This is done by submitting a request to the authorisation module which is responsible for
determining which requests to grant or deny. The authorisation module uses a set of rules
in the logic to make this decision.
A similar logic is described by the previously mentioned Jajodia et al. in [JSS97].
Jajodia et al. define an Authorisation Specification Language (ASL) that maps 4-tuples
(object, user, role set, action) to either authorised or denied.
Lampson et al. in [ABLP92, LABW92] describe a theory of authentication in dis-
tributed systems that allows the source of a request to be identified. Their theory contains
access control mechanisms as well as a notion of principals and a “speaks for” relationship
between those principals to reason about their authority. A principal’s authority can be
deduced by the principals that it can speak for.
Trust Management Systems
Trust management systems introduced by Blaze et al. [BFL96] are a unified approach
to specifying and interpreting security policies and credentials that describe a specific
delegation of trust. Trust management systems unify credentials, access control and au-
thorisations. Security policies and credentials are defined in terms of predicates, called
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filters, which are associated with public keys. Each user is represented by a public key.
Filters accept or reject actions based on the rights a user is trusted to perform.
There are a number of example implementations of trust management systems including
PolicyMaker [BFS98], Keynote [BFK99], REFEREE [CFL+97], Delegation Logic [Li00],
SD3 [Jim01] and Protune [BO05].
2.2 Policy Enforcement
This section provides an overview of some of the current verification technologies available
for ensuring a program adheres to a user’s security policy. Section 2.2.1 introduces the
main attributes for characterising verification technologies with the rest of the sections
outlining verification technologies that exist today. Section 2.2.4 gives a brief summary of
the verification technologies discussed in this section and outlines an issue of concern that
this dissertation aims to address.
2.2.1 Characterising Security Policy Verification Technologies
There are many verification tools that exist for determining if a program satisfies a secu-
rity policy. Each verification tool implements a verification technology. There are many
verification technologies that currently exist, each of which differs from another by four
main factors:
1. Work distribution between a user and a foreign source,
2. Manual vs. automatic verification,
3. Syntactic vs. semantic verification, and
4. Static vs. dynamic verification.
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Verification relies on the generation of a model, abstraction or proof. Work distribution
refers to whom performs the generation and verification of these models, abstractions and
proofs. This is of main interest in mobile program scenarios where a program is created
at a different location from where it will be executed. Work distribution also refers to
the amount of work performed at both the creation and execution locations. In the case
where users create and execute their own applications, they also perform all the work for
verification.
Verification can be performed automatically or manually. Automatic verification of a
program has the advantage of not requiring human interaction, however, it lacks the ability
to perform complete verification as some properties may be undecidable or intractable.
Verification can be performed using the syntax or semantics of a program. Syntac-
tic verification technologies perform verification based on the syntax of a program while
semantic verification technologies perform verification based on what the program does.
Finally, verification can be performed statically, before a program is executed, or dy-
namically, while the program is being executed. Statically checking a program has the
advantage of ensuring that a program is secure prior to its execution, however, it lacks the
ability to verify dynamic information such as user input. Dynamically checking a program
allows for dynamic properties to be checked (e.g., user input). It is possible when dynamic
checking is performed via program monitoring that an unwanted and unsatisfactory oper-
ation may occur before it is checked, and undoing the effects of a partially run program
(e.g., files partially updated) is a major issue. Furthermore, dynamic verification has a
significant speed penalty as checks must be performed while the program is being exe-
cuted. In contrast, static checking has the advantage of verifying once and then executing
multiple times.
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2.2.2 Restriction Mechanisms
One method for ensuring program security is by using a suitable mechanism to restrict the
types of programs that can be executed.
Key Infrastructures
Key infrastructures are used to ensure trust properties. Trust is the extent to which one
party is willing to depend on another [PS05]. Key infrastructures are a technology where
a user will execute a program only if it’s from a particular user whom they trust. There
are a number of key infrastructure mechanisms including Public Key Infrastructures (PKI)
[KHPC01], Simple Public Key Infrastructures (SPKI) [CEE+01, Eli98, HK00] and Simple
Distributed Security Infrastructures [RL96].
While these technologies are widely used and allow a user to know from whom a program
came, they say nothing about the security of the actual program which may indeed be
faulty, intentionally or not.
Sandbox Environments
Sandbox environments are virtual zones in which untrusted programs are executed. The
virtual zones are restricted zones allowing only a restricted set of operations to be executed
on a restricted set of resources. Sandbox environments can be implemented in one of two
ways or in a combination of both. The syntax of the programming language used to encode
the program can be designed to restrict certain operations such that only a safe set of
programs can be encoded within the language. The second approach is where programs are
executed within a virtual environment such that they only have access to virtual memory
and virtual resources. The virtual environment allows no access to resource outside the
environment ensuring the system’s resources are secure from any program executed within
the virtual environment.
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One of the most popular examples of a sandbox environment is the Java Sandbox
[Gon98, GMPS97]. The Java Sandbox model implements both of these features by re-
stricting the language to ensure it is dynamically type-safe and using the Java Virtual
Machine to mediate crucial system calls to ensure in advance that they are secure.
While the Java Sandbox provides a safe environment for programs to be run, it restricts
the types of programs that can be executed. BlueBoX [CC03] is an intrusion detection
system for controlling a process’s access to system resources. BlueBoX lessens the restric-
tions of a hard-bound sandbox environment, such as the Java Sandbox, by allowing a user
to define the bounds of the sandbox by defining the allowable system calls of programs.
The major drawback with BlueBoX is that the kernel needs to be patched to include the
enforcer which allows and disallows system calls based on specified policy rules.
2.2.3 Verification Checking Mechanisms
Another method for ensuring program security is by checking that the program adheres to
a user’s security requirements. This section describes technologies for checking a program.
Model Checking
Model checking [CGP99] is an automatic technique for verifying correctness properties of a
program. The model checking procedure performs an exhaustive search of the bounded/finite
state space of a program to determine if some specific properties hold. The model check-
ing procedure requires two inputs: a finite-state model which represents the program being
verified and a specification stating the properties that the program must satisfy. One of the
major benefits of model checking is once the model and policy specification are specified,
verification is fully automatic and performed before a program is executed. Furthermore,
given the unsuccessful verification of a program, model checking techniques show, via an
error trace, why a program failed verification.
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As stated, model checking depends on the behaviour of a program being represented
as a finite-state model. One problem with this is correctly representing a program as a
finite-state model. This is known as the model construction problem [CGP99]. Another
problem with constructing this model is the state-explosion problem, where, even for small
programs, the number of states of a program is often far greater than can be handled by a
standard computer or often even a supercomputer [Val98]. By using suitable abstractions
[BMMR01, BR02, BB02, CCG+03, FQ02, HJMS03], large programs with possibly infinite
state can be represented. The downside to abstracting a model from a program is that
during the abstraction process information from the program is lost. For example, consider
a program that includes a system call to print a line of text to a given printer. The
abstraction of this program might not differentiate this system call with printing a line to
another printer or to the screen.
The behavioural properties that a program must satisfy (specification) are usually ex-
pressed in some form of temporal logic [HR04]. Common temporal logics used are Linear
Temporal Logic (LTL) and Computational Tree Logic (CTL).
Linear Temporal Logic
Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) is a mechanism for reasoning about properties over time.
LTL is used to encode formulae about the future of paths in a computation tree where a
computation tree represents all possible behaviours of a system.
LTL formulae are defined over atomic propositions. The set AP is defined to be the
set of all atomic propositions and it is assumed there exists the function L : S → P(AP)
that labels each state with a set of atomic propositions that are true in that state. The
syntax for an LTL formula is below. The syntax includes the temporal operators always
(2), eventually (3), next (©) and until ( U ).
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LTL ::= a ∈ AP
| ¬LTL
| LTL ∧ LTL
| 2LTL
| 3LTL
| ©LTL
| LTL U LTL
The semantics of an LTL formula is given below where w is a sequence of states and i
is the current state.
w , i |= p ⇔ p ∈ L(w(i))
w , i |= ¬ϕ ⇔ w , i 6|= ϕ
w , i |= ϕ ∧ φ ⇔ w , i |= ϕ ∧ w , i |= φ
w , i |= 2ϕ ⇔ ∀ n ≥ i • w , n |= ϕ
w , i |= 3ϕ ⇔ ∃ n ≥ i • w , n |= ϕ
w , i |=©ϕ ⇔ w , i + 1 |= ϕ
w , i |= ϕ U φ ⇔ ∃ j ≥ i • w , j |= φ ∧ ∀ n | j > n ≥ i • w , n |= ϕ
Model Checking Tools for Programming Languages
Popular model checking tools include SPIN [Hol97], dSPIN [DIS99], Java PathFinder
[HP00], Bandera [CDH+00], Blast [BHJM07], Magic [CCG+03], MOPS [CW02] and SLAM
[BR02].
One of the most popular is SPIN [Hol97]. SPIN accepts programs in the PROMELA
language and correctness properties in LTL. SPIN automatically translates a LTL formula
into a Bu¨chi automaton [GEP+95] and a program encoded in the PROMELA language
into a finite state automaton. To perform verification, SPIN calculates the synchronous
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product [Hol97] of the Bu¨chi automaton and the finite state automaton. The synchronous
product of two automata is the intersection of the two. The resulting Bu¨chi automaton
specifies the program behaviours that satisfy the LTL formula. If the resulting automaton
is empty then there is no behaviour of the program that satisfies the LTL formula.
SPIN can only verify standard safety properties and a limited range of liveness prop-
erties [Hol97]. Further, SPIN relies on the program to be verified being represented in the
PROMELA language. Java PathFinder [HP00, VHBP00] and Bandera [CDH+00] are both
tools which take a Java source program and translate the program into the PROMELA
language for the SPIN model checker.
Not all tools use an underlying model checker like SPIN. Blast and Magic for example
are both model checkers for checking C programs that use their own model checker.
Blast [BHJM07, HJMS03] is a verification system for checking safety properties of C
programs. Similar to the process in Java PathFinder (JPF), safety properties in Blast are
specified using assert statements throughout C source code. Given a C program instru-
mented with assert statements, Blast transforms this into a suitable model and performs
a reachability analysis on the model to perform verification.
Magic [CCG+03] is a model checking tool that is capable of automatically checking
conformance of a C program against a finite state machine. Unlike Blast and JPF, the
Magic framework uses Labeled Transition Systems (LTS)s to express specifications. Veri-
fication is performed by firstly extracting a model of the program using a technique called
procedure abstraction, and then this model is checked against the LTS specification.
Theorem Proving
Theorem proving is a semi-automatable verification technique for proving program prop-
erties in a mathematical sense. Theorem proving relies on the program being specified
clearly and precisely in a form of logic. Typically, classical first-order logic is used, how-
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ever, higher-order logic is sometimes used. The underlying strength of theorem proving
is that the program and problem to be verified are precisely stated without ambiguity.
However, encoding this in a suitable logic requires an expert.
Unlike model checking, theorem proving techniques can either prove or disprove a the-
orem. They cannot give an error trace like model checkers can showing how verification
failed. As a result of the complexity of some proofs, theorem proving sometimes requires
an expert to guide the system.
Theorem Proving Tools for Programming Languages
Currently there are many implementations of theorem proving tools (theorem provers)
including Elf [Pfe89], Twelf [PS99], λProlog [FGMP90, NM88], LogScheme [RW89], and
Prototype Verification System (PVS) [OSR92]. Some of these use the Edinburgh Logical
Framework (LF) [AHM89, Pfe91, Pfe96] as the underlying logic. Other theorem provers
use alternative means to provide the same functionality. These examples are just a few of
the theorem provers that exist.
Elf is a tool that supports a metalanguage for proof manipulation [Pfe89]. It is intended
for meta-programs such as theorem provers. The metalanguage unifies logic definition
with logic programming (LF with Prolog). It achieves unification by giving types an
operational interpretation the same way Prolog gives clauses an operational interpretation.
The metalanguage is a strongly typed language, since it is directly based on LF.
Twelf is also a tool that supports a metalanguage for specifying, implementing and
proving properties of programming languages and logics [PS99]. Twelf’s metalanguage is an
implementation of LF. Twelf is the successor of Elf, thus is much the same as Elf in syntax
and semantics. Twelf’s metalanguage employs ‘constraint simplification’ and carries along
equational constraints in a normal form. This is used instead of unification because LF
is undecidable. Constraint simplification involves two equivalent constraints representing
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the same information, but, one may be simpler than the other. The implementation of
Twelf comprises three major parts. The first is the core type theory which provides the
infrastructure for representing specifications, algorithms and meta-theory. Algorithms are
executed by the constraint logic programming engine, which is the second part of the
Twelf system. The final part is the meta-theorem proving component that supports the
meta-theory.
λProlog is a logic programming language that extends Prolog by incorporating no-
tions of higher-order functions, λ-terms, higher-order unification and polymorphic types
[FGMP90]. The reason for considering this extension is for the use of representing proofs
and theorems. λProlog is very similar to Elf and Twelf though it differs in the sense that
λProlog doesn’t support LF. Instead, λProlog provides these new features by extending the
classical first-order theory of Horn clauses to the higher-order theory of hereditary Harrop
formulas [FGMP90].
LogScheme is an experimental language where the main features of logic program-
ming, nondeterminism and unification are added into the functional programming lan-
guage Scheme [RW89]. LogScheme differs from other implementations of theorem provers
in that these new features are added into a functional programming language, rather than
incorporating functional programming language terms into a logic programming language.
PVS is verification system, that is, a specification language integrated with tool support
and a theorem prover. The specification language is based on classical, typed higher-order
logic. The theorem prover provides a collection of primitive inference procedures that are
applied interactively under user guidance.
Proof-Carrying Code
Proof-Carrying Code [Nec97, NL96, NL98] (PCC) is an architecture for ensuring the safety
of mobile programs, where mobile programs are those created at one location by a code
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producer and executed at another location. In the PCC architecture, code producers create
proofs of their programs that prove they adhere to a user’s security policy. A producer
sends this safety proof along with the program to the user. Upon receiving a safety proof
and program, a user performs two stages of verification. First, the user checks to see if the
supplied proof adheres to the user’s security policy. Secondly, the user checks the proof
against the program to ensure it has not been falsified.
PCC uses theorem proving techniques to prove the validity of a program, however, the
architecture distributes the work load by placing the burden of generating a proof on a code
producer. This greatly reduces the work load of recipients since checking a proof is much
easier than generating a proof. Further, since a producer creates the proof, this one proof
can be sent to all recipients of the application. However, since the producer is creating the
proof, an extra verification stage must be performed to ensure the proof generated by a
producer has not been falsified.
Current implementations of the PCC architecture use the Edinburgh Logical Framework
to encode proofs. Theorem proving is then used to check the proofs and type checking is
used to ensure the proof has not been falsified. The PCC architecture has been used to
verify both C [Nec97] and Java [CLN00] programs.
Model-Carrying Code
Model-Carrying Code [SRRS01, SVB+03] (MCC) is an architecture similar to PCC and
was designed by Sekar et al. as an alternative to the PCC architecture [SVB+03]. In the
MCC architecture, a model is used instead of a proof and model checking techniques are
used to determine if the model adheres to a user’s security policy.
Sekar et al. describe three ways to ensure a generated model has not been falsified
[SVB+03]. The first way is to use a monitor at runtime to check the consistency of the model
with the program. This would essentially reduce verification to run-time checking. The
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Technology Features of Verification Technology
Onus of
Proof
Static v
Dynamic
Syntax v
Semantic
Automatic
v Manual
Sandbox Environment Embedded
within
language
Dynamic Syntax Automatic
Model Checking User Static Semantic Automatic
Theorem Proving User Static Semantic Manual
PCC Producer Static Semantic Manual
MCC Producer Static Semantic Automatic
Table 2.1: Summary of Verification Technologies
second way is to use trust mechanisms to ensure the sender of the model is trusted. This
would ensure the creator of the model is authenticated and trusted but wouldn’t ensure the
consistency of the model. Finally, the third way is to use the PCC architecture to formally
verify the model. While a model would be substantially smaller than a program, the
overall work load required to generate and verify a proof of the model would be substantial.
Currently, the first method is used.
2.2.4 Verification Technology Summary
Numerous verification technologies exist. Each technology has its abilities and limitations.
Table 2.1 gives a summary of the features of each of the technologies described in this
chapter. Key technologies are omitted from the table as the table’s features are concerned
with the analysis of programs for verification.
The key feature apparent in verification technologies is the semantic analysis of a pro-
gram performed statically. This allows a program to be analyised prior to its execution.
Semantic analysis of a program is ideal as verification is based on what a program does
and not just on its syntax. For some policies however, dynamic analysis may be required.
While automatic verification allows a user to click “go”, manual verification uses an
expert to provide information to help the system when verifying more complex policies.
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Therefore, the option of whether to use manual or automatic verification depends on the
policies being verified as well as who the user is, i.e., an expert or non-expert.
Each user has a set of requirements which specifies what it means for any program
executed on their machine to be secure. Given a user’s security policy, there may not
always exist a single tool that is capable of determining if all program behaviours of any
program adhere to that security policy. To determine satisfaction of a policy, multiple
tools may be required. Using multiple tools from different verification technologies allows
a greater range of security policies to be verified on a greater range of program behaviours.
A problem with using multiple verification tools is the requirement of multiple repre-
sentations of a user’s requirements: one for each tool used to perform verification. By
combining policy languages, multiple tools’ representations can be represented as a single
representation. The next section describes current work on combining policy languages.
2.3 Analysis of Techniques for Leveraging Verification
Technologies
Each verification technology has its own niche and performs well in its own domain. While
each technology can be improved within its own domain, the work presented in this disser-
tation focuses on combining languages and technologies to cover more application domains.
Using multiple verification technologies can enable more application domains to be
verified. Supporting multiple policy languages can allow multiple verification technologies
to be used to verify an application.
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2.3.1 The Heterogeneous Tool Set
There has been limited work done on combining policy languages. Mossakowski et al.
[Mos05, MML07] developed the Heterogeneous Tool Set (Hets), which is a tool set for
combining specifications among different logics using logic translations. Hets was created
with the realisation that large software systems are typically best specified using a number
of specification languages. Common examples include logics for specifications of datatypes,
logics for reasoning about space and time, and logics for specifying security requirements
and policies. Hets allows a system to be specified in a number of specification languages
while still allowing the system as a whole to be verified using one or more proof checkers.
To allow different provers to be used, proof goals can be translated through logics until one
with proof support is reached.
The Hets framework allows a system to be specified using multiple logics and allows
different parts of a system to be proved using one or more different provers. In Hets,
a system is specified as a heterogeneous specification that allows multiple specifications
to be linked together. Heterogeneous specifications are based on individual logics and
logic translations. A logic in Hets has a notion of a signature, and sentences and models
constructed over that signature. Sentences specify the syntax of a logic system. That is,
all the ways in which symbols in a signature can be constructed together while models
define the interpretations of sentences, i.e., the semantics of a logic system. The essential
element of a logic is the essence of satisfaction that relates sentences (syntax) with models
(semantics). The implementation of a logic in Hets consists mainly of syntactic entities for
representing signatures and sentences. The current implementation represents the Common
Algebraic Specification Language (CASL) in approximately 11,500 lines of code. Each logic
used in Hets must also provide a parser that parses an input string for that particular logic.
It is important to know when sentences in one logic can be represented in another logic
such that soundness is preserved. That is, sentences that hold in a model in one logic
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also hold in the models in the translated logic. Logic translations are mappings between
sentences in two logic systems such that soundness is preserved. The founding desire for
logic translations is to permit a theorem prover for one logic to be used on theories from
another logic.
Heterogeneous specifications are used to specify a system in Hets. A heterogeneous
specification, formalised as a development graph [MAH06], consists of a set of nodes and a
set of arrows. Nodes are specifications that follow the syntax of a logic system while arrows
define the links between specifications. Arrows are either definition links, that allow axioms
of other nodes to be inherited, or theorem links, which represent proof obligations between
specifications. Proof obligations represent the proof goals that must be proved for the
system to be sound.
Proof obligations can be proved by using a local theorem prover if one is available for
the current logic. If a prover is not available for the current logic and there exists a sequence
of logic translations from the current logic to a logic with a theorem prover attached, then
the proof obligations can be translated using the logic translations and proved using that
prover.
2.3.2 Conclusion
Combining policy languages allows the capability of using multiple verification technologies
to verify a system. The Hets framework allows a system to be specified using multiple
specifications with the ability to prove proof obligations between specifications to determine
the soundness of a system. The framework relies on each logic being precisely defined along
with any logic translations between logics. While in theory each logic must have both a
syntax and semantics, their implementation induces the semantics of logics via the theorem
provers used. For example, they give Haskell a denotational semantics [TLMM07] based
on its translation into Isabelle/HOL which is the input language to the theorem prover
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Isabelle.
This dissertation presents a framework for using syntactic based transformations be-
tween specifications that alleviates the overhead of semantic definitions. A system in this
framework is represented using an automaton which allows a system to be represented
at multiple levels of abstraction. This allows a user to specify a system abstractly and
use transformations to transform that system between various levels of abstraction from
the abstract to the concrete (tool) level. Verification tools can then be used to verify the
individual tool level representations. Finally, semantics of the abstract system can then be
induced from the verification of the tool level representations.
The framework presented in this dissertation allows multiple verification tools to be
used to verify a system. Syntactic transformations are used between the representations
with the semantics of the system being defined by the verification tools used to verify
the system. The framework however relies on the user specifying the transformations to
encode transformations that are sound, that is, that the input to the verification tools is
appropriate.
The framework presented in this dissertation can be seen as a light-weight implementa-
tion of the Hets framework. The Hets framework consists of a graph of defined logics and
logic translations. A system is then specified using a heterogeneous specification based on
the defined logics. However, in the framework presented in this dissertation, a system is
initially specified in some representation. The system represented in some representation is
then translated into possibly multiple specifications for particular verification tools. Each
specification (apart from the initial one) is induced via the transformation used to produce
that specification. This differs from the Hets framework where each logic must be specified.
A system in the Hets framework is sound if all the proof obligations can be proved.
Instead of using proof obligations, the framework presented in this dissertation uses a notion
of verification. A system in this framework is verified if the verification tools, in conjunction
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with the operators used to link specifications, verify the individual specifications. Since a
specification in this framework can be transformed into multiple specifications, operators
are used to link multiple specifications. It is assumed each operator is suitably defined.
Hets is the main tool available for combining policy languages and as discussed it has
both advantages and disadvantages as a tool for combining policy languages. Therefore,
there is a need to explore different ways to combine policy languages. This research can
lead to finding ways to improve Hets or to providing alternative systems for combining
policy languages. The framework presented in this dissertation contributes to the field
by providing a light-weight and flexible alternative to Hets that has its own, different,
advantages and disadvantages (to be discussed further in later chapters). Thus, it is
logical that this framework will be more suitable than Hets in certain situations, such
as a situation when being “light-weight” is desirable.
The next chapter describes a framework for leveraging verification tools to enhance the
verification technologies available for program verification. This framework allows multiple
verification tools to be used to perform verification without the need to manually specify
multiple representations of a policy.
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Leveraging Verification Technologies
Each user has a policy specifying what it means for any program executed on their machine
to be secure. To accommodate all behaviours of any program, multiple tools may be
required to determine program satisfaction. Using multiple tools to verify a given program
means a user’s security policy requires multiple representations: one representation for
each tool used to verify the given program.
There are two ways to create multiple representations of a policy. Method one is to
manually create the numerous required representations. One of the problems with this
is the effort required if a policy changes, in which case the representations for some, and
possibly all of the verification tools need to be changed. Another problem is if a user would
like to add a new tool to perform some verification, a new representation for that tool is
required. This representation would again need to be manually created. Furthermore, the
representation for each verification tool will probably not be a complete representation of
all of the user’s requirements as each tool probably can not verify all the requirements,
otherwise a single tool would have been used. Therefore, it is necessary to keep track of
which tool is verifying what properties. Maintaining and updating this record and the
representations for each tool is both tedious and error prone.
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Method two alternatively involves automating the process of generating representa-
tions. The next section introduces a framework for automatically generating multiple
representations for multiple verification tools.
3.1 Thesis Framework
This chapter describes a framework for ensuring the security of untrusted programs using
multiple existing verification tools. In the framework, a user has an initial representation
of the requirements any program must adhere to if it is going to be executed on a user’s
machine. This representation is represented at a high level of abstraction allowing a policy
to be specified independently of specific program behaviours. This representation, along
with the untrusted program, is automatically transformed into one tool level representation
for each of the one or more verification tools. Each representation is then used by a specific
verification tool to verify the given program. Figure 3.1 displays a pictorial view of the
framework.
Figure 3.1: Framework
A transformation takes a policy and a program and uses a configuration to generate
one representation for each of the one or more verification tools, where each representation
contains some or all of a user’s security requirements. Given the policy, program and
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appropriate configurations by a person, the process of generating the representations can
be automated. Thus, configurations are manually created to guide the transformation
process by specifying the mappings from one policy representation to another.
Given a policy that has multiple representations where each is in the syntax for a spe-
cific verification tool, a program is verified by each verification tool using the corresponding
representation. Given the successful verification by one tool and the unsuccessful verifica-
tion by another, what does this mean in terms of program satisfaction of the initial policy?
A formal method to produce one overall verification result from one or many individual
verification results will be described in the following sections. In brief, when multiple
representations are generated, the representations are linked together using a number of
operators. These operators are used to specify what overall program satisfaction means in
terms of the individual verification results from specific tools. Firstly, the notation used
to formally describe the framework will be introduced.
3.2 Notation
A language, L, is a possibly infinite set of strings over an alphabet, Σ, where L ⊆ Σω. The
set Σω is the set of all infinite words over the alphabet Σ. An alphabet, Σ, is a subset of the
universal alphabet, Σ ⊆ Σu . A string is an infinite sequence of symbols from an alphabet.
The variable w with possible subscripts is used to represent a string. The notation w(i) is
used to indicate the ith symbol of the string w . The first symbol in a string is at position 0.
The notation w [n..] is used to indicate the substring of the string w from the nth symbol
onwards. The symbol ; is used to denote the concatenation of a symbol onto a string. The
variable s with possible subscripts is used to represent a symbol.
The symbol # is used in front of a symbol from an alphabet to denote the occurrence
of that symbol. The combination #s can be used as a predicate.
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The set Val is used to denote the set of all values. The notation
⋃
u,v∈Val
{read(u, v)} is
used to denote the set of symbols read(u, v) for all values of u and v .
The operator
⊕
is used to denote the choice of all the regular expressions in a given set.
For example,
⊕
{a, b, c} = a + b + c. The operator is formally defined in the definition
below.
Definition 3.1
⊕
ss = p(ss)
where
p(ss) =


s + p(lss) s ∈ ss ∧ lss ∪ {s} = ss
ε | ss |= 0
The notation L(ϕ) where ϕ is a LTL formula is used to specify the language accepted
by the LTL formula. The language accepted by an LTL formula is the infinite set of strings
that satisfy the formula
L(ϕ) = {w | w , 0 |= ϕ}
where the satisfaction of a given formula is defined in section 2.2.3.
3.3 Execution Environments
To express a user’s security requirements, a language can be used to represent those require-
ments. An Execution Environment (EE) is a language for representing a user’s security
requirements in the framework.
Security policy enforcement can be seen as restricting the programs that are allowed
to be executed. For automata, a program is a set of strings that describe all the possible
behaviours of a program. A security policy can be viewed as a filter over the strings in a
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program that filters out all the bad behaviours.
An EE is used to represent a user’s security policy. An EE specifies a language which
defines the allowable strings in a program. A language is defined over a set of symbols from
an alphabet. The definition of an EE is given in Definition 3.2. Common languages used
to define the allowable strings in a language include ω-regular expressions, Bu¨chi automata
and LTL.
Definition 3.2 (Execution Environment)
EE : (Σ,L)
Example Consider the ω-regular language consisting of only a’s and b’s, Σ = {a, b}, and
a user’s policy statement “To be safe, a string must begin with an a and consist of only a’s
and b’s.” An EE that represents this is
LRE = ({a, b}, a(a + b)
ω)
Example This example EE uses LTL to specify that if a given user p reads to file r that
user is at no time after allowed to write to that file. The alphabet for the language is the
set of all read and write symbols for all values of p and r.
LLTL = (
⋃
p,r∈Val
{read(p, r),write(p, r)},L(
∧
p,r∈Val
2(#read(p, r) ⊃ 2(¬#write(p, r)))))
3.3.1 Transforming and Linking Execution Environments
Execution environments can be transformed from one representation to another. This al-
lows a user to have an initial single abstract policy representation which can be transformed
into a specific tool representation. A transformation is a mapping from one EE to another.
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Definition 3.3 (EE to EE Map)
Map : EE → EE
Example This example demonstrates a mapping from one EE to another. The mapping
specifies a mapping from a language that allows only sequences of a’s to an EE that specifies
a language that allows only sequences of b’s where each a is replaced by a b.
f : ({a}, aω)→ ({b}, bω)
f ({a}, ρ) = ({b}, {g(w) | w ∈ ρ})
where g(a; w1) = b; g(w1)
To support verification by multiple tools, EEs are linked together via operators. This
allows the potential of a single policy to be mapped into multiple representations. An
example is depicted in Figure 3.2. The example graph consists of an abstract policy,
IEEAbstract and two configurations that map this IEE into two tool specific IEEs, Tool1 and
Tool2 linked together via an operator. In the figure, the symbol ⊕ is used to indicate an
operator linking two representations.
IEEAbstract
t1
xxqq
qq
qq
qq
qq t2
&&M
MM
MM
MM
MM
M
Tool1 ⊕ Tool2
Figure 3.2: An example graph showing the possible configurations to apply to an IEE.
Operators are used to specify the relationships between languages, that is, what sat-
isfaction of the initial policy means in terms of the tool representations of that policy.
The are many possible operators that could be included to link languages. This section
introduces three operators used in this dissertation: EITHER, BOTH and IMP .
The EITHER operator links two EEs specifying that a program must satisfy either EE
for that program to satisfy the user’s security requirements. The BOTH operator links
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two EEs specifying that a program must satisfy both EEs for that program to satisfy the
user’s security requirements. The IMP operator links two EEs specifying that if a program
satisfies the first EE the program must satisfy the second EE to satisfy the user’s security
requirements. Three scenarios are now explained to show the usage of each operator.
In scenario one, a user’s security requirements are that only one user can write to the
file fileX at a time. For Java programs, both of the tools Java PathFinder and Bandera
can independently be used to verify all of this policy. As long as either Java PathFinder
or Bandera verifies that a given program satisfies this policy, then the program adheres to
the user’s security policy. This is an example of using the EITHER operator between two
policies.
In scenario two, a user’s security requirements are that private information must not
be accessed by users with only public access and only one user can write to the file fileX
at a time. For Java programs, JFlow can be used to verify the information control part
of the user’s requirements while Bandera can be used to verify that only one user writes
to file fileX at any one time. For a program to adhere to the user’s security requirements,
a program must be verified by both JFlow and Bandera. This is an example of using the
BOTH operator.
In scenario three, the user’s security requirements are that if a program uses SQL
queries, then the SQL queries should be safe. Here, two tools are needed. The first to
check if SQL queries are used, which can be done using syntactic analysis tools. Then,
if the first tool verifies that SQL queries are used, another tool is needed to ensure these
SQL queries are safe. This is an example of using the IMP operator.
The syntax of an EE including these three operators is below. Additional operators
can be added as long as an appropriate semantics are given to each added operator.
EE : (Σ,L) | BOTH (EE ,EE ) | EITHER(EE ,EE ) | IMP(EE ,EE )
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The semantics of the operators BOTH , EITHER and IMP are given below.
Definition 3.4 The semantics of the three operators over an EE is
BOTH ((Σ1,L1), (Σ2,L2)) = (Σ1 ∪ Σ2,L1 ∩ L2)
EITHER((Σ1,L1), (Σ2,L2)) = (Σ1 ∪ Σ2,L1 ∪ L2)
IMP((Σ1,L1), (Σ2,L2)) = (Σ1 ∪ Σ2,L
c
1 ∪ L2)
where Lc1 denotes the complement of L1 against (Σ1 ∪ Σ2)
ω.
Example An example EE is below. The EE specifies a language that allows either of the
languages: EE1a or EE1b . Execution environment EE1a specifies that all strings must begin
with an a and consist of only a’s and b’s while execution environment EE1b specifies that
all strings are alternative combinations of a c followed by a b. Execution environment EE1
specifies a language that allows strings in the set a(a + b)ω ∪ (cb)ω.
EE1 = EITHER(EE1a ,EE1b)
where
EE1a = ({a, b}, a(a + b)
ω)
EE1b = ({b, c}, (cb)
ω)
3.4 Intermediate Execution Environments
Execution environments provide a mechanism for encoding a language that acts as a filter
on a program. Using configurations, an EE can be transformed from the abstract level
to the tool level for multiple verification tools. The ability to link EEs introduces the
potential for using intermediate levels to represent an EE between the abstract level and
the tool level.
Using intermediate levels allows a policy to be gradually transformed from the abstract
level to multiple tool representations. This allows a user’s security policy to be maintained
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more easily as there is a step by step paper-trail from the abstract level to the tool level
specifying the tool specific representation for the user’s security requirements. If a user’s
security requirements change, only the configurations from the abstract level to the middle
level need to be changed. Similarly, if a new tool is added, only configurations from the
middle level to the tool level need to be created. Furthermore, once the configurations for
the new tool have been created, they shouldn’t need to be changed. Both of these benefits
assume appropriate configurations are devised.
Using intermediate levels also allows for configurations to be reused. Configurations
that defined similar mappings from one EE to another can be reused, specifically the
configurations mapping an EE into a representation for a specific tool’s syntax.
EEs are changed to Intermediate Execution Environments (IEE)s and an IEE is allowed
to be mapped using a sequence of configurations. Using a sequence of configurations creates
intermediate levels where an IEE is represented prior to being represented in a specific
syntax for a particular verification tool. Figure 3.3 displays a pictorial view of this.
Figure 3.3: Framework using a sequence of configurations.
An IEE has the same structure as an EE, it is simply renamed from an EE to an IEE.
There may not always be a single configuration to apply to a policy. For example,
there may be one configuration for mapping a policy for Java programs and another con-
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figuration for C programs. The possible configurations to apply to an IEE form a graph of
configurations where each node in the graph is a representation of a policy and each edge
is a configuration. An example graph is depicted in Figure 3.4.
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Figure 3.4: Example of a graph that uses configurations to create an intermediate level.
The example graph extends the graph depicted in Figure 3.2 to include an interme-
diate level. The graph indicates that two configurations can be applied to the IEE. One
configuration maps directly to the tool level IEEs using t1 and t2. The other maps to an
intermediate level first, and then into the two tool level IEEs.
3.4.1 Transforming Intermediate Execution Environments
To transform one IEE to another, a single mapping could be used. To enhance the process of
specifying a mapping from one IEE to another, smaller mappings are allowed to be specified
and compose mappings together using a number of operators. Using smaller mappings
allows configurations to be specified more easily. Furthermore, they allow mappings to be
more easily reused. There are many methods for defining a configuration. This section
introduces the method used in this dissertation.
A configuration is composed of mappings. The two types of mappings used in this
dissertation are described below.
Definition 3.5 (Strings to Strings) The first type maps strings to strings. This is de-
fined below where Σ1,Σ2 ⊆ Σ
u .
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Maps = {f | f : Σω1 → Σ
ω
2 }
Definition 3.6 (Strings to Languages) The second type maps strings to languages. This
is used to specify a mapping from a single symbol into multiple symbols ranging over a set
of values. This is defined below where Σ1,Σ2 ⊆ Σ
u .
LiftedMaps = {f | f : Σω1 → PΣ
ω
2}
The definition below shows how the mappings are applied to an IEE.
Definition 3.7 The function TIEE takes a mapping or lifted mapping and an IEE and
defines how a mapping and lifted mapping are applied to an IEE. If the mapping maps
strings to strings, then each string in the IEE is transformed using the mapping. If the
mapping maps strings to languages, each string is transformed using the mapping and
the resulting languages are unioned together. The alphabet of the transformed IEE is the
alphabet of the range of the mapping function. This is denoted by the function ranM.
TIEE : (Maps ∪ LiftedMaps)→ IEE → IEE
TIEE m (Σ,L) =


(ranM (m), {m(w) | w ∈ L}) if m ∈ Maps
(ranM (m),
⋃
{m(w) | w ∈ L}) if m ∈ LiftedMaps
Example This example demonstrates a mapping from strings to strings. The mapping f1
specifies a mapping from strings with the symbol b following the symbol a to the symbol
b with the map of the rest of the string concatenated onto the end, and the symbol a not
followed by the symbol b to the symbol d with the map of the rest of the string concatenated
onto the end.
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f1 : {a, b}
ω → {b, d}ω
f1(a; w) =


d ; f1(w) if w(0) 6= b
f1(w) otherwise
f1(b; w) = b; f1(w)
Example This example demonstrates a mapping from strings to strings where values are
used. The function f2 defines a mapping from the symbol access(u,v) for a particular value
of u and v to the symbol read(u,v) for the same u and v with the mapping of the rest of
the string concatenated onto the end.
f2 :
⋃
u,v∈Val
{access(u, v)}ω →
⋃
u,v∈Val
{read(u, v)}ω
∀ u, v ∈ Val • f2(access(u, v); w) = read(u, v); f2(w)
Example This example demonstrates a lifted mapping where a single symbol is mapped
into multiple symbols. The function fuv defines a mapping from strings with the symbol
access to a set of strings where each string maps the symbol access into the symbol read(u,v)
for every value of u and v.
fuv : {access}
ω → P(
⋃
u,v∈Val
{read(u, v)})ω
fuv(access ; w) = {s1; w2 | w2 ∈ fuv(w) ∧ s1 ∈
⋃
u,v∈Val
{read(u, v)}}
In a configuration, two operators that can be used to combine mappings are: IEE map
composition (◦c) and IEE map shuﬄe (||c). These operators represent function compo-
sition and shuﬄe respectively but over mappings for IEEs. The semantics for the IEE
map composition and shuﬄe operators use the function composition and shuﬄe operators
respectively. The semantics is defined below. The configuration symbols are denoted by a
subscript c.
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IEE map composition combines mappings in a configuration together specifying that
both mappings are applied to an IEE one after the other. The IEE map composition
operator is right associative. The IEE map composition operator is defined in terms of the
function composition operator (◦) defined in Definition 3.8.
Definition 3.8 (Function Composition)
◦ : (Maps ∪ LiftedMaps)→ (Maps ∪ LiftedMaps)→ IEE → IEE
t1 ◦ t2 e = (TIEE t1) ((TIEE t2) e)
The IEE map shuﬄe operator combines two mappings in a configuration where each
mapping is applied to an IEE separately and the resulting languages are shuﬄed together.
The IEE map shuﬄe operator is defined in terms of the shuﬄe operator (||t) defined in
Definition 3.9. The shuﬄe of two sentences is the set containing all arbitrary interleavings
of the two sentences. An example shuﬄe of two regular expressions is
ab || cd = {abcd , acbd , acdb, cabd , cadb, cdab}
The shuﬄe of two languages (denoted by the ||l symbol) is the set of all strings obtained
by shuﬄing all strings of one language with all strings from the other.
Definition 3.9 (Shuﬄe)
||t : (Maps ∪ LiftedMaps)→ (Maps ∪ LiftedMaps)→ IEE → IEE
t1 ||t t2 e = ((TIEE t1) e) ||l ((TIEE t2) e)
where
(Σ1,L1) ||l (Σ2,L2) = (Σ1 ∪ Σ2,
⋃
w1∈L1,w2∈L2
w1 || w2)
s1; w1 || s2; w2 = {s1; wa | wa ∈ (w1 || s2; w2)} ∪ {s2; wb | wb ∈ (s1; w1 || w2)}
To allow the specifier simplicity when splitting representations, a split is explicitly
allowed to be specified in a configuration. A split is specified using link operators. Each
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link operator corresponds to an IEE operator. Thus, for the operators used in an IEE in
this dissertation, three link operators are included in a configuration: BOTHc, EITHERc
and IMPc . Each link operator in a configuration takes two sub-configurations. The sub-
configurations specify how an IEE is going to be transformed and the two results linked
together using the specified operator.
The syntax for a configuration used in this dissertation is given below. The semantics
of this configuration are given in Definition 3.10 below. If additional IEE operators are
included then additional link operators will need to be included in a configuration and
given appropriate semantics.
CompMappings = m ∈ Maps
| lm ∈ LiftedMaps
| CompMappings ◦c CompMappings
| CompMappings ||c CompMappings
Config = CompMappings
| BOTHc(Config ,Config)
| EITHERc(Config ,Config)
| IMPc(Config ,Config)
Definition 3.10 The semantics of a configuration are below where m ∈ Maps, lm ∈
LiftedMaps, cm1, cm2 ∈ CompMappings and c1, c2 ∈ Config.
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[[m]] = TIEE (m)
[[lm]] = TIEE (lm)
[[cm1 ◦c cm2]] = [[cm1]] ◦ [[cm2]]
[[cm1 ||c cm2]] = [[cm1]] ||t [[cm2]]
[[BOTHc(c1, c2)]] = BOTH ([[c1]], [[c2]])
[[EITHERc(c1, c2)]] = EITHER([[c1]], [[c2]])
[[IMPc(c1, c2)]] = IMP([[c1]], [[c2]])
Example This example specifies a simple configuration containing a single mapping and
shows how an IEE is mapped using this configuration. The configuration t1 = f1 specifies
that the function f1 is applied to a given IEE. Consider the IEE
IEE2 = EITHER(IEE2a , IEE2b)
where
IEE2a = ({a, b}, (a)
ω)
IEE2b = ({a, b}, (ab)
ω)
which specifies that all strings must consist of only a’s or must consist of alternating
combinations of an a followed by a b. Performing the transformation t1 EE results in the
IEE
IEE2 = EITHER(IEE2a , IEE2b)
where
IEE2a = ({b, d}, d
ω)
IEE2b = ({b, d}, b
ω)
Example This example demonstrates a transformation of a configuration that contains a
lifted mapping. The example configuration t1b = fuv specifies that an IEE is to be trans-
formed using the mapping fuv . The configuration maps strings of the symbol access to
strings of the symbols read(u,v) for all values of u and v. Performing the transformation
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t1b ({access}, access
ω) would result in the IEE
(
⋃
u,v∈Val
{read(u, v)}, (
⊕
u,v∈Val
{read(u, v)})ω)
Example This example demonstrates the use of function composition. The configuration
t2 below specifies that f1 is applied to a given IEE first and then f3 is applied to the result
of the first transformation. The function f3 maps the symbol b to the symbol c and leaves
the symbol d as is.
t2 = f3 ◦c f1
where
f3 : {b, d}
ω → {c, d}ω
f3(b; w) = c; f3(w)
f3(d ; w) = d ; f3(w)
Performing the transformation t2 ({a, b}, (a+ab)
ω) results in the IEE ({c, d}, (d+c)ω).
Example This example demonstrates the use of the shuﬄe operator to map a string con-
sisting of only a’s to a set of strings containing all the possible interleavings of the symbols
a and d. The configuration, t3 = f1 ||c f4 where f4 is defined below, specifies that an IEE is
transformed using f1 and f4 independently and the results are shuﬄed together.
f4 : {a, b}
ω → {a, c}ω
f4(b; w) = c; f4(w)
f4(a; w) = a; f4(w)
Applying the transformation t3 ({a, b}, a
ω) results in the IEE ({a, d}, (a + d)ω).
Example This example demonstrates a configuration that uses a link operator to split an
IEE. The configuration t4 = EITHERc(f1, f4) specifies that a given IEE is transformed
using f1 and f4 independently and then combined together using the EITHER operator.
Performing the transformation t4 ({a, b}, (a + ab)
ω) results in
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EITHER(({d , b}, (d + b)ω), ({a, c}, (a + ac)ω))
3.5 Implementation
A Haskell implementation of the framework presented in this chapter will be discussed in
this section. The implementation represents languages as LTL formula. While the language
accepted by an LTL formula is a set of strings, the implemented translator is only a subset
of the framework as Bu¨chi automata are more expressive than LTL formula. The version
however is sufficient enough to demonstrate the framework.
3.5.1 IEEs
A temporal logic formula is implemented as the data type TLFormula which contains the
usual temporal logic operators (always , eventually , next) over the data type predicate. A
predicate is implemented using the usual Boolean operators (not , and , or and implies)
over atomic predicates.
An IEE is implemented as the data type
data type IEE = Language TLFormula
| IAND IEE IEE
| IOR IEE IEE
| IIMP IEE IEE
An IEE contains four subtypes. The subtype Language represents a single language
which is a temporal logic formula. The subtype IAND represents a combination of two IEEs
joined together using the BOTH operator. The subtype IOR represents a combination of
two IEEs joined together using the EITHER operator and the subtype IIMP represents
a combination of two IEEs joined together using the IMP operator. Additional subtypes
can be added to this data types for any additional operators a user wants to include in an
IEE.
47
CHAPTER 3. LEVERAGING VERIFICATION TECHNOLOGIES
3.5.2 Configurations
Composed mappings are implemented as rules. There are two types of rules: TLMap and
PMap shown below.
type TLMap = (TLFormula,TLFormula)
type PMap = (Variable, [Value])
TLMap is a type that defines a mapping from one formula to another. The TLMap
rule implements a mapping from languages to languages. The first element specifies the
domain of a function and the second specifies the range of the function. In a TLMap rule
variables can be used in the atomic predicates. Variables are used to specify a particular
set of values from a set.
A PMap rule allows mappings from a variable to a set of values to be specified. This
imitates the functionality of the lifted mapping functions.
A Rule is a list of these two types. A list is used to represent the composition of
functions. A configuration is implemented as a data type of four subtypes shown below.
data type CONF = Rules Rule
| CAND CONF CONF
| COR CONF CONF
| CIMP CONF CONF
3.5.3 The Transformer
The transformer accepts a Haskell list of configurations and an IEE and transforms the IEE
using the given configurations. The transformer consists of three main mapping functions
for transforming an IEE: transIEE, transTLFormula and transVar.
The transIEE function takes a single configuration and an IEE and transforms the
IEE. If the configuration is of the types CAND, COR or CIMP, the function transforms
the given IEE using the two sub-configurations independently and then joins the results
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using the appropriate operator, for example, IAND for CAND. If the configuration is of
type Rules, the transIEE function calls either the transTLFormula or transVar function for
each of the rules in the list of rules, for each language in the IEE.
The transTLFormula function transforms a language using a TLMap rule. All occur-
rences of the formula in the domain of a TLMap rule in a given language are mapped into
its range.
The transVar function transforms a language using a PMap rule. That is, that function
transforms a given language such that any occurrence of the variable in the domain of the
rule that appears in the given language is mapped into the disjunction of the values in the
range of the rule.
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Case Studies and Examples
The framework described in the previous chapter has been tested on a number of case
studies. Each case study demonstrates how an initial abstract policy is represented as an
IEE and then mapped using a sequence of configurations to generate a number of tool
specific representations for that policy.
The first case study shows how multiple tool level representations can be generated from
an initial policy. Depending on the given program, a different sequence of configurations
can be applied to the IEE. The second case study involves threads and shows how the
abstract policy of thread atomicity is transformed into a tool specific implementation.
The final case study is much more complex and involves a mobile phone program which
simulates the TV game show “Who wants to be a millionaire?”. The case study shows
how an initial IEE is transformed into a specific tool for verification.
The case studies now deal with programs. Since it’s easier to transform programs at the
syntactic level, the main configurations are described at the syntactic level. The definition
below shows how syntactic mappings are consistent with the framework.
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Definition 4.1
f : (Σ1,L1)→ (Σ2,L2)
where
L1 = L(Pgm1)
L2 = L(Pgm2)
The transformer transforms Pgm1 to Pgm2 where Pgm2 is the annotated program.
Therefore, the language of an IEE is the language induced by an annotated program,
denoted L(Pgm) where Pgm is a given annotated program.
4.1 Memory Case Study
The Memory case study demonstrates how multiple tool representations can be generated
from an initial representation. The initial user’s security requirements are “To be safe, a
program must be memory safe”. Memory safety is a very abstract term that differs de-
pending on the implementation of a given program. In this example, two implementations
of memory are considered: arrays and stacks. Depending on which implementation(s) of
memory a program implements, a different sequence of configurations is applied to the
initial IEE to generate an IEE specific for that program.
At the high level, an IEE for representing that only safe memory is allowed to be
accessed is
IEEmem = ({memorySafe, notMemorySafe},memorySafe
ω)
The IEE consists of two symbols: memorySafe which represents all memory safe op-
erations and notMemorySafe which represents all unsafe memory operations. The IEE
specifies that all strings must contain only memorySafe symbols.
The symbol memorySafe is very abstract and can have many tool level representations.
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At one level, memory safety can be viewed as safe read and write operations. Alternatively
at another level, memory safety can be viewed as pushing an element onto a stack that is
not full and popping an element from a stack that is not empty. The next section defines
a number of configurations to map IEEmem through a number of intermediate levels into a
number of tool specific representations. By using intermediate levels, additional tool level
representations can be easily added.
4.1.1 Configurations
First, a configuration is specified to map the abstract termsmemorySafe and notMemorySafe
respectively into safe and unsafe, read and write operations. This creates an intermediate
level between the abstract representation for accessing memory and the tool specific rep-
resentations. The configuration trw below defines a mapping from the initial IEE into the
intermediate level just described.
In this chapter, the mappings for each symbol are specified in tables for improved
readability. The left hand column of the table specifies the arguments to the function
while the right hand column specifies the result.
trw = fr ||c fw
fr : memorySafe safeRead
notMemorySafe unsafeRead
fw : memorySafe safeWrite
notMemorySafe unsafeWrite
The configuration consists of two mappings shuﬄed together. The function fr maps
the symbols memorySafe to safeRead and notMemorySafe to unsafeRead in a string,
while the function fw maps the symbols memorySafe to safeWrite and notMemorySafe
to unsafeWrite in a string. By shuﬄing these mappings together, a string consisting
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of memorySafe symbols is mapped into multiple strings containing the safeRead and
safeWrite symbols in any combination.
The next configuration taxi refines both the safe and unsafe, read and write operations
to take three arguments: a memory storage (a), a location in that memory storage for
data to be read from or written to (i), and either the value to be written or the variable
in which to store the read data (x ).
In the table below, the results of each mapping are specified as a set of symbols. Using
a set of symbols in the right hand column, a mapping from a single symbol to a set of
symbols is specified.
taxi :
safeRead
⋃
a,x ,i∈Val
{safeRead(a, x , i)}
unsafeRead
⋃
a,x ,i∈Val
{unsafeRead(a, x , i)}
safeWrite
⋃
a,x ,i∈Val
{safeWrite(a, x , i)}
unsafeWrite
⋃
a,x ,i∈Val
{unsafeWrite(a, x , i)}
The next configuration tsrw below is used to map an IEE such that the safe read
and write operations are mapped to have a check prior to the operations to ensure the
respective operation is safe. At this stage, what exactly is being checked remains abstract
as it depends on the specific implementations of reading and writing to memory. Therefore,
checks are made on the memory storage (a) and the index value (i) used to access memory.
Quantification is used in the table to denote the mapping of all the symbols ranging
over a set values. This simplifies the process of individually specifying a mapping for each
symbol, for all values.
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tsrw : ∀ a, x , i ∈ Val • safeRead(a, x , i) checkRead(a, i).read(a, x , i)
∀ a, x , i ∈ Val • unsafeRead(a, x , i) read(a, x , i)
∀ a, x , i ∈ Val • safeWrite(a, x , i) checkWrite(a, i).write(a, x , i)
∀ a, x , i ∈ Val • safeRead(a, x , i) write(a, x , i)
Depending on the implementation of a program, reading and writing to memory can
have a number of implementations.
Safe Array Access
For memory represented as an array, read operations are the assignment of an element of
an array at some index to a variable while write operations are the assignment of some
value to an array at some index. A safe read or write operation for an array is accessing
an array within the bounds of the array. It is assumed that array indices begin at 0. The
Java notation a.length is adopted to denote the length of an array a. Accessing an array
within the bounds of an array is accessing an index point that is greater than or equal to
zero and less than the size of the array. The configuration tarray below defines a mapping
from the read and write operations for an array implementation.
tarray : ∀ a, x , i ∈ Val • read(a, x , i) (x = a[i ])
∀ a, i ∈ Val • checkRead(a, i) check(0 ≤ i && i < a.length)
∀ a, x , i ∈ Val • write(a, x , i) (a[i ] = x )
∀ a, i ∈ Val • checkWrite(a, i) check(0 ≤ i && i < a.length)
Safe Stack Access
For stacks, read operations are viewing an element from the top of a stack while write
operations are pushing or popping an element to or from a stack. A safe push is pushing
an element onto a stack that is not full. Depending on the implementation, e.g., a stack
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implemented as a linked list, there may not be a maximum size. A safe pop is popping an
element from a stack that is not empty. The configuration tstack below defines a mapping
from the read and write operations for a stack implementation.
tstack :
∀ a, i ∈ Val • read(a, x , i) ε
∀ a, i ∈ Val • checkRead(a, i) ε
∀ a, x , i ∈ Val • (check(!isFull(a)).push(a, x ))
checkWrite(a, i).write(a, x , i) +(check(!isEmpty(a)).pop(a, x ))
Safe Array and Stack Access
Some programs may implement both an array and a stack. Therefore, safe memory access
is safe array access and safe stack access. The configuration tas below specifies a mapping
from the read and write operations for a stack and an array implementation.
tas = BOTHc(tstack , tarray)
Configurations for Verification Tools
The configurations for mapping an IEE into specific syntaxes for a number of verification
tools are now defined. For this case study, the tool Blast is used to verify C programs and
the tools Bandera and Java PathFinder are used to verify Java programs.
For the tools Blast and Java PathFinder, checks can be encoded as assert statements.
The configuration tassert below defines a mapping from the symbols check(c) for some
value c into the symbol assert(c). By using values, the configuration can be reused for all
mappings from checks to asserts.
tassert : ∀ c ∈ C • check(c) assert(c)
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In the configuration tassert , the set C contains all the values for the checks. For this
case study, the set C is defined below for an array and stack respectively.
Carray =
⋃
a,i∈Val
{0 ≤ i && i < a.length}
Cstack =
⋃
a∈Val
{!isEmpty(a)} ∪
⋃
a∈Val
{!isFull(a)}
For the Bandera tool, checks are represented using assert statements but in a different
syntax to Blast and Java PathFinder. In Bandera, assertions have the form
/ ∗ ∗∗@assert ∗ POSTInv :< assert >; ∗/
where < assert > is a particular boolean expression that is going to be checked by
Bandera. The configuration tbandera below defines a mapping from a check into a Bandera
syntax assert statement. Similar to the configuration tassert , the configuration tbandera uses
values to make the configuration reusable.
tbandera : ∀ c ∈ Val • check(c) / ∗ ∗∗@assert ∗ POSTInv : c; ∗/
4.1.2 Memory Verification
Depending on the program being verified, different sequences of configurations can be
applied to IEEmem . Figure 4.1 shows a graph of the possible sequences of configurations.
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Figure 4.1: Graph of possible configurations for safe memory. The
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At the tool level in Figure 4.1, the letters in the brackets represent the type of memory
implementation the IEE is specifying (a for array, s for stack and as for both an array and
stack) and the tool(s) that can be used to verify a program using the IEE (a for assert, so
either JPF or Blast depending on whether the program is in C or Java respectively, and
b for Bandera). For example, the intermediate execution environment IEEmem(ab) will be
used by Bandera to verify programs that implement memory as an array.
For this case study, four C and four Java programs were implemented. The Java
programs implemented have the same functionality as the C programs. Two programs were
implementations to test array verification: one for safe array access and the other for unsafe
array access. Similarly, two programs were implementations to test stack verification: one
for safe stack access and the other for unsafe stack access.
For the two C programs that implemented memory as a stack, the sequence tassert ◦c
tstack ◦c tsrw ◦c taxi ◦c trw IEEmem was used. For the two Java programs that implemented
memory as a stack, the sequence of configurations tbandera ◦c tstack ◦c tsrw ◦c taxi ◦c trw IEEmem
was used. For the two C programs that implemented memory as an array the sequence
of configurations tassert ◦c tarray ◦c tsrw ◦c taxi ◦c trw IEEmem was used and for the two Java
programs that implemented memory as an array the sequence of configurations tbandera ◦c
tarray ◦c tsrw ◦c taxi ◦c trw IEEmem was used.
For each program, the syntactic function was used to automatically insert the assertions
transformed from the configurations into a program. Applying this function, the alphabet
of the IEE becomes the alphabet of the transformed IEE plus the alphabet of the program,
and the language of the IEE becomes the language induced by the annotated program
resulting from the syntactic function.
Given an annotated program, all tools were successful in verifying the safe implemen-
tations and not verifying the unsafe implementations.
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4.2 Bank Case Study
The second case study is a Java program involving threads that simultaneously access a
user’s Bank account. With multiple users accessing the account simultaneously, there is a
possibility that resources will be interfered with.
The Java program consists of an account and methods for crediting and debiting money
to and from the account. The pseudo code for crediting and debiting money is shown in
Figure 4.2.
debit(amount)
if (balance − amount >= 0)
then
balance = balance − amount
else
error
credit(amount)
balance = balance + amount
Figure 4.2: Pseudo code for crediting and debiting money to and from an account.
The importance of thread atomicity is shown in the scenario presented in Figure 4.3
where two debtors attempt to debit an amount of money from the same account at the
same time. In the example, assume the starting balance is $110.
debtor1 : debit($100)
debtor1 : if ($110 > $100)
debtor2 : debit($20)
debtor2 : if ($110 > $20)
debtor1 : balance = $110− $100
debtor2 : balance = $10− $20
Figure 4.3: Scenario that involves thread interference.
This scenario is neither the desired nor the expected computation. The desired and
expected outcome is that one transaction will succeed and the other will fail due to insuffi-
cient funds. Instead, both debtors were able to debit money from the account resulting in
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a negative balance. With thread interference it is possible for money to disappear or even
appear.
Ensuring the atomicity of actions is important. The IEE below specifies a policy that
allows only atomic actions to be performed.
IEEbank = ({atomicAction, nonAtomicAction}, atomicAction
ω)
There are many ways to ensure thread atomicity. For this case study the intermediate
execution environment IEEbank is mapped through a number of intermediate levels into a
tool specific representation. Through each intermediate level, both the actions that are
atomic and the representations of atomic actions at the tool level are refined.
4.2.1 Configurations
A number of configurations are defined to map the intermediate execution environment
IEEbank into tool specific representations.
First, a configuration specifying the actions that need to be atomic are defined. In this
case, the actions debit and credit are to be atomic. The configuration tcd below defines
this mapping.
tcd = fc ||c fd
fc : atomicAction atomicCredit
nonAtomicAction nonAtomicCredit
fd : atomicAction atomicDebit
nonAtomicAction nonAtomicDebit
This configuration consists of two mappings joined together using the shuﬄe operator.
The configuration maps strings consisting of atomicAction symbols into strings containing
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any combination of atomicCredit and atomicDebit symbols.
Next, what it means for the debit and credit actions to be atomic are defined. For this,
the configuration taa is used to map the symbols atomicCredit and atomicDebit into the
sequences p.credit .v and p.debit .v respectively. The symbols p and v are abstract symbols
used to represent acquiring a resource and releasing a resource respectively.
taa : atomicCredit p.credit .v
nonAtomicCredit credit
atomicDebit p.debit .v
nonAtomicDebit debit
A number of mechanisms can be used to ensure the atomicity of an action. For Java,
actions are atomic if the operation is encapsulated within a synchronized block. The
configuration tsyn defines a mapping from p to the beginning of a synchronization block
and v to the close of the block.
tsyn : p synchronized{
v }
4.2.2 Verification of Thread Atomicity
For this case study, the intermediate execution environment IEEbank was mapped using the
sequence
tsyn ◦c tcd ◦c taa IEEbank
This mapped IEE specifies that for Java programs, all debit and credit method calls
need to be encapsulated within a synchronized block. Using Java itself as a syntactic
checking tool, the Java bank program was verified to ensure all credit and debit method
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calls were encapsulated within synchronized blocks.
4.3 Millionaire Case Study
The final case study aims at lowering the restrictions placed on a mobile phone for a
particular application. The application of interest isMillionaire, a computer application of
the game “Who Wants to be a Millionaire” for mobile phones. The game supports certain
features that would usually be seen as a security risk. This case study shows how the
security concerns apparent in the application can be expressed in the framework presented
in this dissertation, regardless of the implementation of the program. Given a specific
implementation of the Millionaire application, the method for transforming the security
requirements into usable representations is described below.
By initially representing the security requirements independent of the implementation
of the application, that representation can be reused for all implementations of the appli-
cation. This is possible because the security concerns are the same for all implementations
of the application. Thus, the initial encoding of the security requirements does not need
to be changed for new implementations of the program. However, the implementation of
certain program features can vary according to the specific implementation the program.
Therefore, the exact process of verification depends on the implementation of the program,
but only the configurations mapping the high level security requirements into tool specific
representations need to be changed for each new implementation.
For this case study, the Millionaire computer game is implemented in Java. Given this
Java implementation, the IEE specifying the security concerns rising from the Millionaire
application is transformed so specific verification tools can be used to determine whether
the Java program satisfies these security concerns. The verification tools used in this case
study are Java PathFinder (JPF) and Bandera, which were chosen because of the author’s
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familiarity with them.
4.3.1 Millionaire Background
The Millionaire application has been adapted from the TV game show “Who Wants to be
a Millionaire.” The game consists of answering a number of consecutive questions. Each
question has four multiple choice answers, one of which is correct. When a player answers
a question correctly, they move on to the next question. If the player answers a question
incorrectly, the game ends. The goal of the game is to answer as many questions as possible.
The more questions answered correctly, the higher the prize money incentive.
To help the player with harder questions, the game offers lifelines. Each player has
three lifelines: 50:50, ask the audience and phone a friend. Each lifeline can only be used
once. The 50:50 lifeline removes all but two of the multiple choice answers, one correct
and one incorrect. Thus the player has a fifty percent chance of answering the question
correctly.
The ask the audience lifeline is a poll taken by the audience. The poll asks the audience
which multiple choice option they think is correct. The results of the poll are then given
to the player. This allows the player to know what the audience thinks the answer is.
Finally, the phone a friend lifeline allows the player to call one friend. The player
has thirty seconds to communicate with the friend. Usually this communication involves
the player telling the friend the question and the possible answers, followed by the friend
providing their opinion regarding the correct answer.
4.3.2 Adaptation of Millionaire
In this case study, the TV game show “Who Wants to be a Millionaire” is implemented as
a computer application for mobile phones.
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The Millionaire game for mobile phones used in this case study uses the same principles
as “Who Wants to be a Millionaire.” The main difference between the TV game show and
the mobile phone application is that the player plays on a mobile phone instead of in a
television studio. As a result of this difference, a few changes are made to the game. The
main difference is that only two lifelines are given in the mobile phone application. The
reason for this is that the ask the audience lifeline is not included because there is no
audience involved when playing on a mobile phone.
The application consists of a start up phase that collects information from the player
and initialises the game. During the start up phase of the application, the player is asked
to enter two friends for the phone a friend lifeline. If the friend is not already in the player’s
address book, the name and number of that friend is requested and then entered into the
address book. When the phone a friend lifeline is used, the player is asked to selected one
of the two friends given in the start up phase. The Millionaire application then looks up
their number in the player’s address book and calls the friend.
One of the main issues identified in the Millionaire mobile phone game is the potential
for a player to play outside the parameters of the game. This can occur by a player
obtaining information from someone without the use of a lifeline. To prevent this, players
are not allowed to phone or message anyone while playing the game. During the start
up phase of the Millionaire application, the phone’s ability to make phone calls or send
messages is disabled. By disabling these features, players are unable to use them, which
helps to ensure that players play within the parameters of the game. Once the application
has concluded, the features are re-enabled.
As it is impractical to ensure that no one is physically near the player and helping them
during the game, it is assumed that players play alone. Furthermore, it is assumed that
the player does not have other devices, such as a computer, second mobile phone or PDA
with them.
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4.3.3 Security Concerns
TheMillionaire application uses certain features which access secure mobile phone features.
These include managing an address book, making a telephone call, and enabling and
disabling mobile phone features. A number of security concerns arise from these features.
These security concerns need to be addressed so recipients of the Millionaire application
can know whether the application is safe or whether it will harm their mobile phones.
Most of the security concerns arise from the phone a friend lifeline. The phone a friend
lifeline performs three tasks: entering new information into the address book (optional),
obtaining telephone numbers from the address book and making a telephone call. All of
these tasks involve either accessing phone memory or the hardware of the phone.
With regards to entering new information into the address book, the main security
concerns are that no information in the address book is overwritten (P1) and that at most
two names are added into the address book (P2).
With regards to obtaining a telephone number, the security concern is that only a
friend’s number, selected during the start up phase of the application, is looked up and
that no other information is accessed (P3).
With regards to making a telephone call, the security concerns are that at most one
phone call is made (P4) and only a friend’s number is dialed (P5).
The other security concerns arise from the application’s mechanism for ensuring players
play within the parameters of the game. More precisely, security concerns arise from
enabling and disabling the message and telephone features. The first security concern
which arises is ensuring that only the message and telephone features are disabled (P6).
The second security concern arises from ensuring that if either of these features are disabled,
then at some point before the application ends, they are enabled (P7).
Table 4.1 shows a summary of the security relevant features for the Millionaire appli-
cation.
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Name Description
P1 No overwriting of information in the address book
P2 No more than two names are added into the address book
P3 Only friends information is looked up in the address book
P4 Only one phone call is made
P5 Only a friend’s number is dialed
P6 Only the message and telephone features are disabled
P7 Disabled features are restored to their original settings
Table 4.1: Summary of security relevant issues
4.3.4 Millionaire Security Policy
There are a number of ways the security concerns mentioned in the previous section can
be represented in the framework presented in this dissertation. One method is to encode
all the security concerns as a single IEE. An alternative method is to encode each security
concern as a separate IEE and use the BOTH linking operator described in section 3.3.1
to link all the security concerns. This method is depicted in Figure 4.4.
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Figure 4.4: Graph showing each security concern represented as a separate IEE
The second method is much more appealing because of the flexibility if any of the
security concerns change. A change in the security concerns can be isolated so that IEEs
representing the other security concerns are not affected. Furthermore, the IEEs can be
freely combined in a way that appropriately represents the user’s security requirements.
An IEE for each of the security concerns, as listed in Table 4.1 above, is described in the
following paragraphs.
Security concern P1 specifies that information in the address book cannot be overwrit-
ten. There are four ways an address book can be accessed: add, delete, search and change.
These four operations form the basis of the alphabet for the IEE for security concern P1.
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This alphabet is below.
Σ1 = {add , change, delete, search}
By preventing any changes or deletions of information in the address book, security
concern P1 is captured. IEE IEEP1 specifies a language that allows only adding and
searching of an address book.
IEEP1 = (Σ1, (add + search)
ω)
Security concern P2 specifies that at most two names are added into the address book.
While a language could be specified allowing at most two add operations, this is very
restrictive. If the security requirements change then the language needs to be altered.
Instead, security concern P2 can be captured by placing a check before any add symbol.
The check, represented by the symbol checkAdd , is an abstract symbol which allows the
restrictions on the add operation to be changed without having to change the language for
the IEE. IEE IEEP2 below specifies a language that allows sequences of checking an add
followed by an add operation.
Σ2 = {add , checkAdd}
IEEP2 = (Σ2, (checkAdd add)
ω)
Security concern P3 specifies that only friends’ information is looked up in the address
book. Similar to security concern P2, security concern P3 is captured by placing a check
before any search operation is made. The symbol checkSearch is an abstract symbol used
to represent the restrictions on the search operation. IEE IEEP3 below captures secu-
rity concern P3 by specifying a language where a check is performed before every search
operation.
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Σ3 = {search, checkSearch}
IEEP3 = (Σ3, (checkSearch search)
ω)
Security concern P4 specifies that the application makes at most one phone call while
security concern P5 specifies that only a specified friend is dialed. For these security con-
cerns a call symbol is introduced indicating the program making a phone call. To capture
security concerns P4 and P5, a single check can be used before any call operation. The
symbol checkCall is used to represent this check. Similar to the checkAdd and checkSearch
symbols, the checkCall symbol is left abstract. Security concerns P4 and P5 are captured in
a single IEE, IEEP45 below, that specifies a language that allows sequences of the symbols
checkCall call .
Σ45 = {call , checkCall}
IEEP45 = (Σ45, (checkCall call)
ω)
Security concern P6 ensures that only the message and telephone features are disabled
on a player’s phone. For this security concern symbols are introduced that represent
disabling features. The symbols
⋃
f ∈Val
{disableFeature(f )} are used to denote the disabling
of all features f .
Security concern P6 states that only the message and telephone features are allowed to
be disabled at the start of the application. The symbol init is used to denote the start of the
application. To specify security concern P6, the message and telephone features are allowed
to be disabled in any order. The symbols disableFeature(msg) and disableFeature(tel) are
used to denote the disabling of the message and telephone features respectively.
IEE IEEP6 represents security concern P6. The alphabet for this IEE includes the
symbols
⋃
f ∈Val
{disableFeature(f )} for disabling features and the symbol init .
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Σ6 = {init} ∪
⋃
f ∈Val
{disableFeature(f )}
The language the IEE specifies allows the message and telephone features to be disabled
after the symbol init .
IEEP6 = (Σ6, (init ((disableFeature(msg) disableFeature(tel))+
(disableFeature(tel) disableFeature(msg)))ω)
The final security concern, P7, specifies that the message and telephone features are
enabled at some point before the application ends. The symbols
⋃
f ∈Val
{enableFeature(f )}
represent the enabling of each feature f . Before the end of the application, denoted by the
symbol exit , the message and telephone features must be enabled. The alphabet Σ6 below
includes the symbols
⋃
f ∈Val
{enableFeature(f )} for enabling features and the symbol exit .
Σ7 = {exit} ∪
⋃
f ∈Val
{enableFeature(f )}
The IEE for security concern P7 is below.
IEEP7 = (Σ7, ((enableFeature(msg) enableFeature(tel))+
(enableFeature(tel) enablefeature(msg)))
exit)ω)
Given that the telephone feature was disabled at the beginning of the application, to
make a phone call this feature must be temporarily enabled. Furthermore, after a phone
call, this feature must be disabled once again. IEE IEEP45 is refined to include this.
Σ45 = {call , checkCall} ∪
⋃
f ∈Val
{enableFeature(f )} ∪
⋃
f ∈Val
{disableFeature(f )}
IEEP45 = (Σ45, (enableFeature(tel) checkCall call disableFeature(tel))
ω)
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Currently, the language of each of the six IEEs only includes the symbols specific to
that IEE. For example, IEE IEEP2 specifies a language that allows infinite sequences of
the symbols checkAdd add . Given a program that performs numerous operations including
searching and calling, for example, the program will not adhere to the IEE IEEP2. This is
because the other symbols allowed in the Millionaire application are not being specified in
the language of the IEE.
The language of each of the IEEs above is extended to include the symbols present in
the Millionaire application such that the IEEs still capture the security concerns for that
IEE. A prime is used to denote the extension of the non-primed IEEs. The primed IEEs
are shown below. The alphabet for all IEEs is the union of all the alphabets. This is
specified in the alphabet Σm below.
Σm = {add , change, delete, search, checkAdd , checkSearch,
call , checkCall , init , exit} ∪
⋃
f ∈Val
{disableFeature(f )} ∪
⋃
f ∈Val
{enableFeature(f )}
The language of IEE IEEP1 is extended to allow the symbols from Σm , except for those
symbols used to specify security concern P1, to be included in the language. The symbols
used to specify security concern P1 are add , search, change and delete. L1 is used to
denote the language that represents the infinite sequences of symbols from Σm that does
not include the add , search, change and delete symbols.
The language of IEEP1 is extended to allow all arbitrary interleavings of the current
language IEE IEEP1 specifies with L1. To do this the shuﬄe operator defined in defini-
tion 3.9 in section 3.4.1 is used. The operator shuﬄes the language of IEEP1 with the
language L1. The primed IEE is defined below.
IEEP1′ = (Σm , (add + search)
ω ||l L1)
where L1 = ((checkAdd + checkSearch + checkCall + call + init + exit)+⊕
f ∈Val
{disableFeature(f )}+
⊕
f ∈Val
{enableFeature(f )})ω
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The languages of IEEs IEEP2, IEEP3 and IEEP45 cannot be extended in a similar way.
This is because each check for an operation must directly precede the operation itself, and
the shuﬄe operator would allow other symbols in between the check and the operation
itself. Instead, the languages of IEEs IEEP2, IEEP3 and IEEP45 are all extended to allow
sequences of an operation preceded by its check and any of the symbols from Σm that does
not include the operation or its check. Symbols need to be omitted to ensure the security
concern is still captured by the primed IEE. The symbols omitted are add and checkAdd
for IEE IEEP2′ , search and checkSearch for IEE IEEP3′ and call and checkCall for IEE
IEEP45′ . These primed IEEs are below.
IEEP2′ = (Σm , (checkAdd add + S2)
ω)
where
S2 = ((change + delete + search + checkSearch + checkCall + call + init + exit)+⊕
f ∈Val
{disableFeature(f )}+
⊕
f ∈Val
{enableFeature(f )})
IEEP3′ = (Σm , (checkSearch search + S3)
ω)
where
L3 = ((change + delete + add + checkAdd + checkCall + call + init + exit)+⊕
f ∈Val
{disableFeature(f )}+
⊕
f ∈Val
{enableFeature(f )})
IEEP45′ = (Σm , (enableFeature(tel) checkCall call disableFeature(tel) + S45)
ω)
where
S45 = ((change + delete + add + checkAdd + search + checkSearch + init + exit)+⊕
f ∈Val
{disableFeature(f )}+
⊕
f ∈Val
{enableFeature(f )})
The languages of IEEs IEEP6 and IEEP7 are both extended in a similar way. The
language of IEE IEEP6′ extends IEEP6 to allow any finite sequence of symbols from a
subset of Σm after the message and telephone features have been disabled. Allowing a
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sequence of symbols only after this ensures that at the start of the application, the message
and telephone features are disabled.
The finite sequence of symbols allowed after the disabling of the message and telephone
features represents the applications operations, that is, adding, calling and searching. The
symbols included in this sequence are all the symbols from the alphabet Σ except for
all symbols for enabling and disabling features (except for the message and telephone
features) and the init symbol. The symbols for enabling and disabling features are omitted
because security concern P6 specifies only the message and telephone features are disabled.
Therefore, the enabling and disabling of other features cannot be allowed in the language.
The primed IEE is below.
IEEP6′ = (Σ, (init ((disableFeature(msg) disableFeature(tel))+
(disableFeature(tel) disableFeature(msg)) + (S6)
∗)ω)
where
S6 = (add + checkAdd + search + checkSearch + call + checkCall + exit+
disableFeature(tel) + enableFeature(tel) + disableFeature(msg) + enableFeature(msg))
Similarly, the language of IEE IEEP7′ extends IEEP7 to allow any sequence of symbols
from a subset of Σm before the message and telephone features have been re-enabled and the
exit of the application. Allowing a sequence of symbols only before the re-enabling of the
exit symbol and the message and telephone features ensures that the message and telephone
features are re-enabled before the application ends. This ensures security concern P7 is
still captured. The sequence of symbols allowed includes all symbols from the alphabet
Σm except the exit symbol. This is shown below in the IEE IEEP7′ .
IEEP7′ = (Σ, (S7)
∗ + ((enableFeature(msg) enableFeature(tel))+
(enableFeature(tel) enablefeature(msg))) exit)ω)
where
S7 = (add + checkAdd + search + checkSearch + call + checkCall + init+⊕
f ∈Val
{disableFeature(f )}+
⊕
f ∈Val
{enableFeature(f )})
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Given the six primed IEEs above, the Millionaire security policy is now defined. The
Millionaire security policy is all the IEEs linked together using the BOTH operator. This
specifies that all security concerns must be satisfied by a given program. The IEE IEEmil is
used to denote the combination of all the individual security concern IEEs. This is defined
below.
IEEmil = BOTH (IEEP1′,BOTH (IEEP2′,BOTH (IEEP3′,
BOTH (IEEP45′,BOTH (IEEP6′, IEEP7′)))))
Alternatively, this IEE could be specified as a single IEE and not as a combination of
multiple IEEs. An IEE that represents all the security concerns in one would be (Σm ,L)
where L is defined below.
L = (init ((disableFeature(msg) disableFeature(tel))+
(disableFeature(tel) disableFeature(msg)))
(checkAdd add + checkSearch search+
enableFeature(tel) checkCall call disableFeature(tel))∗
((enableFeature(msg) enableFeature(tel))+
(enableFeature(tel) enablefeature(msg)))
exit)ω
The IEE specifies a language that supports all seven security concerns. The IEE allows
sequences of an initialisation followed by the disabling of the message and telephone features
in any order. This is followed by any number of add, search or call operations in any order
with an appropriate check before each operation, as well as the enabling and disabling of
the telephone feature before and after a call respectively. Finally, a sequence ends with
the enabling of the message and telephone features in any order followed by the exit of the
operation.
Both this IEE and IEE IEEmil represent the same security concerns for the Millionaire
application. The framework allows either representation to be used. Specifying each secu-
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rity concern as an individual IEE and combining them all is much more appealing because
changes in one security concern won’t affect changes in any other IEE.
Given a specific program, the security concerns can be transformed into specific syntax
so a specific verification tool can determine if the program satisfies the security concerns.
The next section describes a specific implementation of the Millionaire game. Given this
implementation, a number of configurations are defined for transforming the IEE IEEmil
above so verification tools can determine if the program satisfies the IEE.
4.3.5 Implementation of the Millionaire Application
The Millionaire application is implemented in Java using the MIDlet suite [FZ01]. This
allows the application to be run within the Java Virtual Machine on a mobile phone.
To support the extra features provided by the application, two additional packages are
implemented: the pim package [Sun00b] for supporting an address book, and the telephony
package [Sun00a] for making a phone call. Only the relevant classes and methods from
these packages are implemented for the case study.
In addition, a Phone class was created that mimics the functionality of a mobile phone.
The implementation supports features for making phone calls and adding details into, and
deleting and retrieving details from, the address book. The Phone class is implemented
for verification purposes.
Currently there is no support for enabling, disabling or altering hardware features, such
as the SMS or telephone features of a mobile phone. To support this for verification pur-
poses, a simple API is implemented that allows these features, identified by port numbers,
to be enabled and disabled.
The next section describes a number of configurations for transforming the Millionaire
security policy into tool specific representations for the Java program.
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4.3.6 Configurations
This section describes the configurations used to transform the security concerns defined in
section 4.3.4. A configuration, which is a syntactic transformation, induces an IEE which
induces semantics. Using syntactical transformations means the framework is light-weight
and flexible. This allows ease of specifying configurations and ease of combining them
together.
Instead of defining a single configuration from the implementation independent security
concerns to the tool level, a number of configurations are used to gradually map the security
concerns for the given Java program. This allows any changes to the policy to be more easily
maintained. Furthermore, given a different implementation of the Millionaire application,
some configurations can be reused.
Four configurations are defined for this case study. The first two configurations refine
the abstract symbols used to specify the security concerns. At this level, the security
requirements are still program independent. The last two configurations map the security
concerns for the given Java program described in section 4.3.5 so specific verification tools
can verify the program.
The first configuration refines the add , change, delete, search, call , checkAdd , checkSearch
and checkCall symbols. The add , change and delete operations with their respective checks
are all refined to include the user’s details that the operation is adding, changing or delet-
ing. The search and call operations with their respective checks, on the other hand, are
refined to include the user’s name that is going to be searched or called. The configuration
tmap below defines this mapping. In this configuration, the value d denotes a user’s details
while the value n denotes a user’s name. All symbols not specified in the table are mapped
to themselves.
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tmap : add
⋃
d∈Val
{add(d)}
change
⋃
d∈Val
{change(d)}
delete
⋃
d∈Val
{delete(d)}
search
⋃
n∈Val
{search(n)}
call
⋃
n∈Val
{call(n)}
checkAdd add
⋃
d∈Val
{checkAdd(d) add(d)}
checkSearch search
⋃
n∈Val
{checkSearch(n) search(n)}
checkCall call
⋃
n∈Val
{checkCall(n) call(n)}
The second configuration tinit below maps the abstract symbols checkAdd(d), checkSearch(n)
and checkCall(n) into specific checks specified in section 4.3.3. The checkAdd(d) symbol is
refined into a check over a value that checks that the current number of user’s added is less
than two. For this check, the details of a user are not relevant and therefore are removed
from the check. The value added is used to keep track of the number of users added into
the system. This map is depicted below.
addCheck(d) 7→ check(added < 2)
When a user’s details are added, the added value needs to be incremented. The add(d)
operation is mapped into a sequence that increments the added value after an add(d)
operation.
add(d) 7→ add(d) incr(added)
The checkSearch(n) symbol is refined into a check that checks that the name searched
76
CHAPTER 4. CASE STUDIES AND EXAMPLES
is one of the friends added into the system. For this, the details of an added user need to be
stored. The add(d) symbol is further mapped into a sequence that includes an operation
for storing the users added into the system. The symbol store(d) represents this. The
stored(d) symbol represents a function for checking if a user’s details were stored in the
system.
add(d) 7→ add(d) incr(added) store(d)
searchCheck(n) 7→ check(stored(n))
The checkCall(n) symbol is refined into a check that checks that no more than one call
is made and that the number called is one of the stored friends. The value called is used to
represent the number of phone calls made. The call(n) symbol is also refined to a sequence
of operations that increments the number of calls made after a call operation. That is,
checkCall(n) 7→ check(stored(n)&&called < 1)
call(n) 7→ call(n) incr(called)
For the add and call checks, two values were introduced: added and called . These
values need to be initialised at the beginning of the program. The symbols init(added)
and init(called) are used to represent the initialisation of the added and called values
respectively.
The methods for storing a user’s details and checking if a user’s details have been stored
also need to be created. This allows the functions to be independent of any given program.
At this level of abstraction, the symbol storage is used to represent all the initialisations
and methods needed for storing details and checking stored details. The init symbol is
mapped into a sequence of symbols for initialising the added and called values and for
creating the storage methods.
init 7→ init(added) init(called) storage
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The configuration tinit specifying the maps specified above is below.
tinit : ∀ d ∈ Val • add(d) add(d) incr(added) store(d)
∀ d ∈ Val • checkAdd(d) check(added < 2)
∀ n ∈ Val • checkSearch(n) check(stored(n))
∀ n ∈ Val • checkCall(n) check(stored(n)&&called < 1) incr(called)
init init(added) init(called) storage
The configurations tmap and tinit transform an IEE into one that is still program inde-
pendent. The variables added and called , as well as the symbols store(d) and stored(n),
are program independent. Given a C or Java program, for example, specific syntactic con-
figurations can be specified to transform the security requirements for the given program.
This case study describes configurations for transforming an IEE for the Java program
described in section 4.3.5. The next section defines a configuration for mapping the IEE
into Java specific syntax.
Configurations for Java Syntax
Until now, the configurations have mapped symbols to symbols, where symbols include
placeholders. This allows the symbols to still be both language and program independent.
A configuration can now be specified mapping the symbols into syntax of a specific lan-
guage, for example Java or C. In this case study, the configurations for mapping these
symbols into Java syntax are shown.
The next configuration, tsyn , maps the checks, increments and initialisations into Java
specific syntax. The checks, increments and initialisations introduce the variables added
and called into a given program. These variables are created and used independently of any
given program. This ensures these variables are not altered by the program. Therefore,
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regardless of the Java program being verified, these mappings won’t need to be changed.
All increments have the same syntax. Therefore, a function similar to tassert can be
used to map symbols of the form incr(v), where v is the variable being incremented into
the symbol v = v + 1; . The function fincr below defines this where I = {added , called}
fincr : ∀ i ∈ I • incr(i) i = i + 1;
A similar function can be defined for variable initalisations.
finit : ∀ i ∈ I • init(i) int i = 0;
Both the functions fincr and finit are Java specific maps. For different programming
languages, these functions need to be changed. However, for different Java implementations
of the Millionaire application, these functions don’t need to be changed.
The specific implementation of the application is now considered. The next function
maps symbols into symbols specific for the program being verified. All symbols not men-
tioned are mapped to their identity. If the implementation of the application uses different
symbols for adding, search, etc, these mappings then need to be defined.
The abstract symbol storage is used to represent all the necessary initialisations and
methods for storing a user’s details and checking if a specified name has been stored by
the user. For these methods, the format used in the implementation for storing a user’s
name and details needs to be known. This means the function may need to be changed for
each program to depict the format used to represent these values in the implementation.
To store a user and check if a user has been stored, two methods are created and inserted
into a given program: stored and store. The function stored returns true if a user’s details
have been stored given their name and returns false otherwise. The function store takes as
an argument a user’s details and stores it into a data structure. The data structure used in
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this case study is an array. By inserting these methods and data structure into a program
it ensures a program does not edit these security relevant details.
The storage symbol is further mapped into two initialisations for storing details in an
array and keeping track of how many details have been stored. It is assumed there is some
class Detail in the program that stores a user’s details and has appropriate methods for
accessing a user’s name and number. It should be noted that if a program does not contain
this class, by default it will be rejected. The symbol storage is mapped into the code below.
private Detail details [2] = new Detail();
private int numDetails = 0;
public void store(Detaild){
details [numDetails ] = d ;
numDetails ++;
}
public boolean stored(String name){
for(int x = 0; x < numDetails ; x ++){
if (details [x ].getName.equal(name))
return true;
}
return false;
}
The function fstore specifies a mapping from the symbol storage into the code above.
For user brevity, the function is omitted. Finally, the configuration tsyn below defines the
mappings of the three functions described above.
tsyn = fstore ◦c fincr ◦c finit
At this stage, a number of configurations can be used to map the requirements into a
tool specific representation. For this case study, two Java verification tools are used: JPF
and Bandera. Each of the tools JPF and Bandera should be able to verify all of the given
security concerns in the Java program. Therefore, the final configuration ttools specifies
that the Java program satisfies the initial security concerns if it is verified by either of
the verification tools. The configuration makes use of the configurations tassert and tbandera
previously defined for the JPF and Bandera tools respectively.
ttools(C ) = EITHERc(tassert ◦c C , tbandera ◦c C )
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The configuration ttools takes an argument, C . This configuration specifies that the
configurations C are used to transform an IEE first followed by tassert to generate one IEE
and similarly again for tbandera to generate a second IEE. The resulting IEEs are combined
together using the EITHER operator specifying that either of the tools JPF or Bandera
must satisfy their respective programs for the Java program to satisfy the initial security
concerns.
4.3.7 Program Verification
The four configurations defined could be applied to each of the individual IEEs representing
each of the security concerns. This would allow a program to be verified one property at
a time. The flexibility of the framework allows the same configurations to be applied to
the combination of all the security concerns, that is, IEE IEEmil . For this case study the
latter method is chosen. Using this method allows all the security concerns to be verified
at once.
The IEE IEEmil representing all the security concerns was mapped using the sequence
of configurations below.
ttools(tsyn ◦c tinit ◦c tmap IEEmil)
The end result of the transformations is two IEEs: one in the syntax for the JPF
verification tool and the other in the syntax for the Bandera tool. Figure 4.5 shows a
pictorial view of the transformations.
Given the two IEEs, the assert statements, initalisations and incrementations were
automatically inserted into the Java program. Given an instrumented program, JPF was
able to verify the respective instrumented program while the Bandera tool didn’t accept its
respective instrumented program. Since satisfaction was specified to only rely on either of
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Figure 4.5: Path of Transformations taken for the Millionaire Policy
the verification tools to verify the program, the Java program satisfied the initial security
concerns due to JPF verifying its respective instrumented program.
4.3.8 Discussion
This case study demonstrates that a real world example program can be verified, given a
user’s security requirements, using the framework presented in this dissertation.
In this case study, a user’s security requirements are initially specified independently
of the implementation of the application. Each security concern at this initial level is
specified as a single IEE and linked together using the BOTH operator. Specifying each
security concern as a single IEE allows changes in a security concern to only affect their
corresponding IEE.
Given the initial IEE representing the security concerns, a number of configurations
are used to transform that IEE into representations for the JPF and Bandera verification
tools. The first two configurations refine the abstract symbols in the initial IEE. The
next configuration maps the symbols into Java specific syntax with the last configuration
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mapping the symbols for the JPF and Bandera verification tools. The end result of the
transformation process is the two annotated Java programs for the JPF and Bandera tools.
The flexibility of the framework presented in this dissertation allows a user’s security
concerns to be represented in multiple ways. The security concerns could be represented
with each concern in its own IEE combined together to form one IEE, or with all the security
concerns represented directly in a single IEE. Regardless of which method is chosen, the
same configurations specified in this case study can be applied to any of the initial IEEs.
The Java program in this case study satisfies the initial user’s security requirements if
either tool JPF or Bandera verified their respective annotated program. While in theory
both tools should be able to verify the properties specified on the Millionaire application,
in practice it proved challenging with only one tool being able to verify the Java program
in the end.
One of the main problems faced was attempting to verify the application within the
MIDlet suite. This was solved by creating stubs for all of the classes and methods used
from the MIDlet suite. Functionality remained the same (to the extent it needed to),
however, source files now exist and the overall size of the stubs was drastically smaller
than the MIDlet suite. Size of an application is also a common problem in verification
[ZLL04, Zit03].
After creating stubs for the MIDlet suite, further alterations need to be made to the
program to remove the IO system used. Since IO is undecidable, JPF was unable to
verify applications with IO support. To solve this, the random function supported by JPF
[Hav99] was used. The random function is used in switch statements to determine which
case in the switch statement is executed. When verifying a switch statement, JPF chooses
all paths as possible executions of an application. This removes the undecidability of user
input without changing the functionality of the application.
After slightly altering the code to remove all user input, and replacing the condition
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statements dependent on user input with JPF’s random function, JPF was able to accept
the application for verification. Initially, the verification process never terminated. After
analysis of the application, it was established that the verification process entered an
infinite loop. This was caused by the application’s design. The application supported a
user friendly interface in which players could, in certain menus, go back to the previous
menu. This caused JPF to go into a continuous loop when verifying the application.
Once all of the back options in the application were removed, JPF successfully verified the
application.
Application design also lead to Bandera being unable to accept the instrumented Mil-
lionaire application for verification. Bandera rejected the application because of the exis-
tence of recursion in the application.
The flexibility of the framework allows ease of specifying configurations. This is partic-
ularly useful for inducing multiple tool representations as this case study showed. Having
the ease in specifying multiple configurations that allows redundant tool representations to
be induced is useful in a case such as this, where the application design meant one of the
tools didn’t accept the program. However, since another tool was able to verify the pro-
gram, it can be verified that the program satisfied the initial user’s security requirements.
Thus, the framework as a whole was successful in this case study.
Comparison to the Hets Framework
This section describes how this case study could be encoded in the Hets framework and
the similarities and differences between the Hets framework and the framework used in
this case study.
Using the Hets framework, a user could describe the Millionaire security concerns in
some logic. Similar to how the security concerns were initially specified for this case
study, the user could describe the security concerns independently of any implementation.
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The user could then encode a specific implementation of the Millionaire application in a
similar or different logic. Proof obligations would then need to be specified saying that
the implementation is a refinement of the abstract security concerns. That is, that the
implementation adheres to the security concerns. The system would be sound if the proof
obligations could be proved by a theorem prover.
In both the Hets framework and the framework used in this case study, the security
concerns are represented at multiple levels of abstraction. At one level the security con-
cerns are represented independently of any specific implementation, while at another level,
they’re for a specific implementation.
In the Hets framework, the language used to describe each level of abstraction needs
to have a precise syntax and semantics defined in the framework. As an example from this
case study, the abstract symbols check , checkAdd , checkSearch and checkCall for example
would need to have a semantics defined for each symbol. In the framework presented in
this dissertation, these checks are syntactically mapped to JPF and Bandera assertions.
If a C program was implemented, these symbols could be mapped into Blast assertions,
for example. The semantics of these checks are induced by the verification tools used to
determine program satisfaction.
This case study demonstrates the abilities of the framework presented in this disser-
tation. The flexibility of the framework allows the security concerns arising from the
Millionaire application to be represented in a number of ways. Regardless of the method
chosen, a number of configurations are created allowing the security concerns to be trans-
formed into tool specific representations for the JPF and Bandera verification tools. Given
the successful verification of JPF for the Java program implemented for this case study, it
is successfully verified that the Java program adheres to the Millionaire security concerns.
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Discussion
Ensuring the security of programs is an important issue. It may not always be the case
that a single verification tool is capable of verifying if all program behaviours of a program
satisfy a given policy. This dissertation describes and presents the implementation of a
framework for using multiple existing verification tools to verify a program.
In the framework, a user’s security requirements are represented as intermediate execu-
tion environments. IEEs provide a mechanism for allowing a user’s security requirements
to be split into multiple representations linked via appropriate operators. Using config-
urations to define how to map from one IEE to another, an IEE can be automatically
transformed through a series of transformations into multiple tool specific representations.
To validate the framework three case studies have been performed and presented in the
previous chapter. The memory case study demonstrates how a single abstract policy can
be mapped into multiple representations. Depending on the implementation of memory
in a program and the verification tool used to verify the program, a different sequence of
configurations are required. Furthermore, some configurations are designed such that they
can be reused.
The bank case study demonstrates how concurrency can be handled in the framework.
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In the case study, a synchronized block is used to ensure thread non-interference for the
Java bank program. The case study used a number of intermediate levels to transform the
initial IEE. This means that if a specifier wanted to change the mechanism used for ensuring
thread non-interference, depending on the new mechanism used, only the mechanism level
would need to be changed.
Themillionaire case study demonstrates the framework in the larger picture. The initial
IEE is substantially larger than the other case studies. This is due to the complexity of
the policy requirements. The flexibility of the framework allows the security policy to
be represented in a number of ways. Regardless of the method chosen to represent the
security policy, a number configurations were created to transform the security policy
into tool specific representations for the JPF and Bandera verification tools. Given a
different implementation of the Millionaire application, different configurations can be
plugged into the framework allowing the respective tool representations to be induced
from these configurations.
Using intermediate levels, each initial policy is gradually mapped through a sequence of
configurations into a number of IEEs for specific verification tools. Using intermediate lev-
els allows each configuration to be clearly specified. This allows the policy to be maintained
more easily as a change at the abstract level can be followed through to the tool level(s).
Furthermore, individual configurations, specifically the configurations for mapping a policy
into a specific tool can be reused.
5.1 Conclusion
Limited work has been done on combining policy languages. The aim of this dissertation
is to describe a framework for leveraging verification tools to enhance the verification
technologies available for policy enforcement. It was initially stated that the aims of this
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dissertation were:
1. Using the concepts viewed in existing policy languages, to use language theory to
capture a user’s security requirements for multiple representations.
2. Using language theory, to build a framework for transforming a user’s security re-
quirements from an initial representation into multiple representations so multiple
verification tools could be used.
3. To aid in the transformation process, use manually created configurations to de-
scribe how to transform between representations and how to link these transformed
representations.
4. To define what it means for a program to satisfy a user’s requirements in terms of the
generated representations of those requirements and the tools used to enforce those
requirements.
These aims have been achieved by providing the following contributions that have been
detailed in previous chapters:
1. To capture a user’s security requirements, IEEs are used. IEEs allow a user’s security
requirements to be represented at multiple levels of abstraction.
2. A framework was designed and implemented that allowed IEEs to be transformed
between different levels of abstraction. The framework allows a user’s security re-
quirements to be automatically transformed into multiple representations for multiple
verification tools.
3. To define how one IEE is transformed into another, the framework uses configurations
which are manually defined by the user.
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4. The semantics of the operators used to link IEEs in the framework is defined so it
can be induced if a given program satisfies a user’s security requirements given the
results of multiple verification tools.
The main limitation of the framework presented in this dissertation is that it is assumed
that configurations are appropriately defined. This is a result of the configurations being
purely syntactical. In the framework it is possible to specify a configuration that maps
some security property to true, which may allow an unsafe program to be determined safe.
Hence, the assumption is that the creator of the configurations will encode them correctly,
according to the original security requirements.
The framework presented in this dissertation contributes to the field by providing a new
approach allowing multiple verification tools to be used to determine program satisfaction
that is both light-weight and flexible.
5.2 Future Work
In the Millionaire case study, there was substantial work required in manually changing
the Java code so the program would be accepted by the Java PathFinder tool. An area of
future work would involve creating configurations to specifying how to map a program so
that it could be automatically mapped along with an IEE.
Currently, if multiple tools are used to perform verification, specifically using the
BOTH and IMPoperators to link languages, each tool is individually run on the given
IEE and the results are manually looked at to determine whether the overall verification
passed or failed. Automating the running of the verification tools and automating some
desirable output to the user is another area of future work.
Finally, mitigating the limitation mentioned in the previous section is also an area of
future work.
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